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A NEW LEGAL THEORY TO TEST EXECUTIVE PAY: 
CONTRACTUAL UNCONSCIONABILITY 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham* 
 
Abstract 
 
Lucrative pay to corporate managers remains controversial yet continues to evade 
judicial scrutiny for legitimacy. Although many arrangements likely would pass the most 
rigorous scrutiny, it seems equally clear that some would not. Some agreements are not the 
product of arm’s-length bargaining, can rivet managers on short-term stock prices at the 
destruction of long-term business value, and can misalign manager–shareholder interests. Yet 
even such objectionable arrangements are immune from serious legal oversight. In theory, they 
are open to judicial review under corporate law, but shareholders challenging pay contracts 
face formidable procedural hurdles in derivative litigation and substantive obstacles from 
corporation law’s business judgment rule and the anemic doctrine of waste. A new legal theory 
would be useful to check board excesses in the population of clearly objectionable cases.  
 
This Article explains why and how traditional contract law’s theory of unconscionability 
should be used to create a modicum of judicial scrutiny to strike obnoxious pay contracts and 
preserve legitimate ones. Under this proposal, pay contracts that are the product of managerial 
domination of the process and formed on terms massively favoring the executive will be stricken. 
This will follow direct shareholder lawsuits in state courts where the contract is made or 
performed and applying that state’s contract law. This new legal theory circumvents today’s 
dead-end route, where pay contracts are always upheld in derivative shareholder lawsuits 
applying corporate law that sets no meaningful limits on executive pay. This proposal creates 
new but modest pressure from sister states on Delaware to take greater responsibility for the 
effects its production of corporate law has nationally.  
 
For those outraged by lopsided corporate executive compensation, this Article offers an 
appealing new legal theory of contractual unconscionability to police them. Those who see no or 
few problems with contemporary pay arrangements, or who are outraged by federal regulatory 
schemes like the Dodd–Frank Act, will welcome how this proposal is narrowly tailored using 
common law to address the most obnoxious cases.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Executive pay has skyrocketed in recent decades, stoked by stock-based components 
extolled under a three-pronged theoretical logic that proved problematic in practice.
1
 Law and 
economics’ optimal contracting theory promised that boards would fashion optimal pay 
arrangements,
2
 but practice showed limits on this ideal.
3
 Finance theory’s hypothesis of efficient 
markets, with stock price as a proxy for performance,
4
 overlooked gaps between short-term price 
and long-term results.
5 
Corporate legal theory’s agency model proposed that stock-based pay 
would align managerial incentives with shareholder interests,
6
 yet evidence shows that 
corporations can create perverse incentives departing from that model.
7
 Law fueled the engine: 
federal tax law encouraged stock-based pay; federal securities-disclosure law stimulated a 
ratcheting up as executives sought raises to beat their peers; and Delaware, free of competition 
from other states in setting the nation’s corporate laws, looked the other way.8 
 
Given these infirmities, reformers propose increased shareholder power to strengthen 
optimal contracting theory’s promise, redesigning contracts to focus on the long term, and 
diminishing the alignment rationale of stock-based pay in favor of an executive-retention 
                                                          
1
 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Executive Compensation: If There’s a Problem, What’s the Remedy? The Case for 
―Compensation Discussion and Analysis,‖ 30 J. CORP. L. 675, 687 (2005) (―[M]any believed that significant stock 
option grants would align shareholder and managerial interests . . . . Beliefs about the desirable effects of stock 
options proved to be, at best, only partly correct . . . .‖); 
Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447, 460–61 (2008) (noting that stock-based pay 
was to ―align‖ managerial and shareholder interests but ―[t]he success of these measures is debatable, at best‖); 
Cynthia A. Williams, Icarus on Steroids, 94 GEO. L.J. 1197, 1226 (2006) (reviewing DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE 
BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM (2005)) (―The 
theory of granting stock options is that they would align the interests of managers and shareholders . . . to reduce 
agency costs. The reality has proven more problematic.‖). 
2
 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. REV. 271, 277–
78 (1986); Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Effect of Shareholder Proposals on Executive 
Compensation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1031 (1999). 
3
 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751 (2002). 
4
 Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 
MICH. L. REV. 2088, 2101 (1994). 
5
 See Lynn A. Stout, Share Price as a Poor Criterion for Good Corporate Law, 3 BERKELEY. BUS. L.J. 43, 54 
(2005). 
6
 E.g., William J. Carney & Leonard A. Silverstein, The Illusory Protections of the Poison Pill, 79 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 179, 210 (2003) (―[S]tock and stock options . . . align managers’ incentives with those of stockholders . . . .‖); 
Troy Paredes, The Importance of Corporate Law: Some Thoughts on Developing Equity Markets in Developing 
Economies, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 401, 405 (2007) (arguing that stock options ―help align‖ 
recipient interests with shareholder interests). 
7
 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. L. 967, 981 n.129 (2009) 
(―In theory, stock options . . . align manager and shareholder interests . . . . In practice . . . the differing time horizons 
of managers and shareholders may give rise to conflicts of interest.‖); Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation and 
Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 136 (stock options ―may only roughly align pay with 
performance‖). 
8
 See infra Part II.A. 
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rationale.
9
 To fill the legal lacuna, the Dodd–Frank Act of 201010 partially responded to these 
calls. It gave shareholders precatory votes on pay packages, enhanced the role of independent 
directors in setting compensation levels, and expanded disclosure to include the ratio of top pay 
to median pay and the relation of pay to firm performance.
11
 But the infirmities in executive pay 
design remain, and these incremental legal reforms still rely on longstanding corporate 
mechanisms that continue to insulate pay from judicial review for legitimacy. The contracts 
remain subject to legal evaluation solely through the lens of corporate law, whose conventional 
reposing of power in boards, along with boundless judicial deference, protects the arrangements 
from judicial scrutiny.  
 
It is time for a fresh approach to this problem: applying the contractual unconscionability 
doctrine to test executive pay. This proposal is designed to appeal equally to those who believe 
that executive compensation poses a broad systemic problem requiring wholesale reform, and to 
those who believe that, at best, there are occasional excesses warranting targeted scrutiny. It will 
appeal to those who perceive a systemic problem because it has no effect on any other enacted or 
proposed reform. It will appeal to those who perceive only discrete problems because it is 
precisely tailored to target only those special cases. Testing pay contracts using contract law 
requires surmounting several hurdles that will assure a screening function so that only the most 
odious contracts are exposed. Those hurdles are surmountable without requiring any action of 
any legislative or regulatory body. The proposal requires only interested lawyers to identify a 
proper case and proceed as this Article elaborates.
12
  
 
It can be tempting to think of contractual unconscionability in terms of paternalistic 
impulses intended to protect vulnerable types, such as consumers and employees, from 
themselves and from predation at the hands of the unscrupulous. The standard modern 
illustration appearing in contracts casebooks protects an impoverished and uneducated single 
mother from a repugnant cross-collateral clause in a predatory consumer sales contract written in 
boilerplate legalese.
13
 It may be difficult for the contemporary legal mind to transplant that 
image to the rarified context of the corporate boardroom, where sophisticated directors advised 
by experts hammer out a deal with an equally sophisticated and advised executive.  
 
But the unconscionability doctrine is not limited to the context of judicial paternalism for 
consumers and employees. It catches bargains that no fair-minded person would propose and no 
                                                          
9
 See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915 
(2010) (suggesting a framework for linking executive compensation to long-term performance and shareholder 
value). 
10
 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §§ 951–956, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1899–906 (2010). 
11
 Id. §§ 951–953. For large banks, this Act is more directive, ordering federal regulators to adopt rules banning 
contingent executive compensation that yields excessive pay or generates material risk of loss to the bank. Id. § 956. 
12
 This new legal theory applies to all executive employment contracts used in the for-profit corporate form of 
business organization, including those providing compensation during employment and for severance upon 
termination of employment. Much of this Article’s analysis focuses on stock-based pay contracts because they (a) 
form the bulk of contemporary senior executive compensation and (b) present the most pernicious risks of 
overreaching. The contractual analysis applies equally to executive employment contracts used in other 
organizations not using stock-based pay, such as labor unions or not-for-profit corporations, though the doctrinal 
hurdles would differ considerably. 
13 Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture, 350 F.2d 445 (D.D. Cir. 1965). 
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rational person would assent to.
14
 Absent from the boardroom are shareholders who often 
deserve greater protection from lopsided bargains than corporate law provides. Corporate law 
works well when boards act in shareholders’ interests, consistent with optimal contracting 
theory, or when boards depart from that model to violate corporate law duties stated in statutes or 
judicially developed fiduciary law. But corporate law breaks down when managerial power 
dominates board decision-making and results in executive pay contracts that are unconscionable; 
yet, such power evades judicial review because of the inherent limits of corporate law. Those 
inherent limits also pose several hurdles to testing executive pay by contractual 
unconscionability, which is readily overcome in a proper case. 
 
The first hurdle is the internal affairs doctrine, a choice-of-law principle that can make 
the law of the state of incorporation applicable to a corporation’s internal arrangements.15 As 
with officer-incentive devices authorized by boards to align managerial incentives with 
shareholder interests, it is tempting to treat pay contracts as governed by the internal affairs 
doctrine. That means corporate law applies—Delaware’s corporate law for most large U.S. 
corporations. Under the doctrine of waste, even exorbitant pay contracts pass muster. But seeing 
executive pay as an internal affair is not inevitable. It is also increasingly clear that many pay 
contracts are not the internal alignment devices that they were once held out to be; rather, they 
are employment agreements designed for retention.
16
 And because they are not matters of 
internal affairs, they would be governed by the law of the state having the greatest interest.
17
  
 
Managers could name Delaware as the choice of law by contract and maintain 
Delaware’s quasi-monopoly that insulates the devices from judicial scrutiny. Yet contractual 
choice-of-law clauses are but one factor relevant to determining what law governs a contract.
18
 
Other considerations include the contract’s place of formation and performance. In some cases, 
that choice of law would not be dispositive against an assertion of contractual unconscionability, 
since a declaration of contractual unconscionability can render all terms of a contract 
unenforceable.
19
 In addition, Delaware contract law shows incrementally greater willingness to 
police unconscionable bargains than its corporate law polices transactions amounting to waste. 
20
 
 
                                                          
14
 E.g., Waters v. Min Ltd., 587 N.E.2d 231 (Mass. 1992). 
15 See VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108, 1112 (Del. 2005). 
16
 Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 9. 
17 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 301 (1971). There is also considerable debate about the 
legal origins and legitimacy of the internal affairs doctrine. See infra notes 243–48 and accompanying text. 
18 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971) (stating that the enforceability of choice of law 
provision entails a two prong-test: (1) whether there is a reasonable relation between the contract and the 
jurisdiction’s law chosen, and (2) absence of tension with a fundamental policy of the state whose law would apply 
absent the clause). 
19 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981) (explaining that courts faced with an unconscionable 
contract term ―may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of the contract without the 
unconscionable term . . . .‖); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 380–86 (2d ed. 1990) (noting judicial approaches 
to declarations that contracts are invalid as a matter of public policy and how courts sometimes refuse to enforce any 
part of a contract containing a repugnant clause along with mediating doctrines that enable striking the obnoxious 
clause while preserving others). 
20
 See infra Part IV. 
6 
 
Shareholder challenges to pay contracts are habitually classified as derivative under 
corporate law.
21
 This poses obstacles to judicial scrutiny. Boards have complete power to 
manage a corporation, including its litigation.
22
 Shareholders suing on the corporation’s behalf, 
in derivative cases, must first demand that a board redress the claim or show why it would be 
futile to seek demand.
23
 Boards committed to a pay contract can rebuff such demands, and 
corporate law’s test for demand futility defers to boards, thwarting shareholder claims. But just 
as treating pay contracts as internal affairs is not inevitable, shareholder challenges to them can 
be classified as direct. The primary remedy sought is rescission, and the theory of liability is that 
the corporation lacked legal power to enter into the contract. This is known as ultra vires in 
corporate law,
24
 and state corporate law statutes authorize these claims to be brought as direct 
actions.
25
 Even if treated as derivative, the ultra vires assertion justifies excusing shareholder 
demand on the corporation’s board as futile,26 and some challenges to executive-pay contracts 
reach the merits even though they are classified as derivative.
27
 
 
  While these hurdles to enabling review of executive-pay arrangements under contract law 
are high, the route is simpler and incrementally more likely to succeed than the dead-end route of 
corporate law. The gauntlet should help persuade those who do not see executive pay as a serious 
systemic problem (or skeptics about judicial scrutiny of board decisions) to tolerate the 
prescription. Only the most egregious cases would qualify and be limited to this class of 
claims.
28
 Those cases warrant such rebuke. Furthermore, consistent with the hypotheses that 
managers respond to shareholder outrage
29
 and judicial shaming,
30
 even a few cases holding an 
                                                          
21 See Feldman v. Cutaia, 951 A.2d 727, 728 (Del. 2008); Kramer v. W. Pac. Indus., Inc., 546 A.2d 348, 349 (Del. 
1988); Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 779; Gordon, supra note 1, at 691 (―Suits challenging executive compensation 
were deemed to be derivative, not direct, because the injury of putatively excessive compensation was to the 
corporation itself or to all shareholders as a group.‖); Charles M. Yablon, Overcompensating: The Corporate 
Lawyer and Executive Pay, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1867, 1902–04 (1992) (reviewing GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF 
EXCESS (1991)). 
22
 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2006). 
23
 E.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984). Shareholders pursuing derivative lawsuits also generally 
face additional technical requirements concerning standing and posting a bond as security for expenses. E.g., Bangor 
Punta Operations, Inc. v. Bangor & Aroostook R.R. Co., 417 U.S. 703, 712 (1974). 
24
 Ultra vires means beyond the power, and corporations are empowered to pursue lawful, but not unlawful, 
activities. Claims that a contract is unconscionable can constitute a claim that it is unlawful and therefore beyond the 
power of a corporation to form. See infra text accompanying notes 291–97. 
25
 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 124(1); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 203(a)(1) (McKinney 2003); MODEL BUS. 
CORP. ACT § 3.04(b)(1) (2007); PRINCIPLES OF CORP. GOVERNANCE § 7.03 (1992); Kent Greenfield, Ultra Vires 
Lives!: A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality, 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1352–55 (2001). 
26
 See Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, No. Civ. A. 19191, 2002 WL 31888343 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2002). 
27
 See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 46 (Del. 2006); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 
249 (Del. 2000). These cases are analyzed towards the end of this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 335–
50. Trial court opinions have also sometimes treated demand as futile in derivative cases challenging executive 
compensation. E.g., In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009); In re 
Viacom S’holder Derivative Litig., No. 602527/2005, 2006 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 2891, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 23, 
2006). 
28
 Other sometimes-controversial corporate decisions, such as merger and acquisition activity, are clearly within the 
internal-affairs doctrine and thus outside this Article’s prescriptive scope. See infra note 328. 
29
 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 64 (2004). 
30
 See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 
1103–04 (1997) (discussing how judicial shaming can constrain corporate managers to the interests of the 
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executive-pay contract unconscionable would influence contract design and courts evaluating 
their legality. 
 
 A well-known case involving The Walt Disney Company (―Disney‖) illustrates both 
how corporate law handles such challenges and the incremental but potentially important 
differences that would result using contract law. The board of Disney, a Delaware corporation 
based in California, approved an employment contract with a top recruit following sloppy 
procedures that cast doubt on whether the board took its duties seriously. The contract was made, 
performed, and terminated in California. The executive worked for Disney for fourteen months 
before the board fired him. The termination triggered a $140 million payout with features that 
may have induced the executive to perform poorly, but not terribly, to receive the short-term 
windfall. The Delaware court observed that the contract did not involve the internal affairs 
doctrine, that board procedures were ―casual if not sloppy and perfunctory,‖ and that the pay was 
―exceedingly lucrative, if not luxurious.‖31 Despite the court calling the case ―troubling,‖32 
shareholders ultimately lost the derivative suit. 
 
Suppose instead that shareholders had sued the corporation and the executive in 
California, asserting unconscionability and seeking rescission.
33
 California contract law applies 
because the contract was made, performed, and terminated there. If classified as derivative, the 
case would proceed without demand, as it did in Delaware, and shareholders could even credibly 
assert the right to a direct action by stressing that they seek the remedy of rescission and 
portraying the contract to be so egregious as to be unlawful and beyond the corporation’s power 
to form. On substance, though $140 million may be a trifle in the dreamland of Hollywood or in 
a company Disney’s size, it shocked even the Delaware courts. Their difficulty was comparing 
the payout to the value of recruiting the executive, inducing the judges to defer under corporate 
law’s business judgment rule. Judges testing the contract from a contract-law perspective would 
not have been as inclined to hold their noses. 
 
The Disney case usefully shows most of the differences between the corporate-law and 
contract-law approaches. But the primary reason for discussing the case is because it is among 
the very few cases challenging executive pay that surmounted the formidable corporate-law 
obstacles to generating an appellate opinion on the subject. That yields a further justification for 
this Article’s proposal. Currently, corporate law as it relates to executive compensation provides 
essentially no limits. Within the common law on the subject, all the cases point in one direction: 
more pay and on any terms managers can get boards to agree to. Most common-law subjects 
produce a pool of important and interesting cases that wrestle with the complexities of business 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
shareholders). See generally David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001) 
(discussing shareholders’ response to judicial shaming).  
31
 Brehm, 746 A.2d at 249. 
32
 Id. 
33
 When presenting a version of this paper to an audience that included many distinguished practicing lawyers 
representing plaintiffs in corporate litigation, one informed me that she had originally filed a claim in the Disney 
matter in California court that would have included claims of the kind I am describing. She reported that nearly 
simultaneously another firm had filed the Disney action in Delaware. Ensuing procedural and strategic jockeying 
among those and other interested law firms resulted in the Delaware case being pursued and the California case 
abandoned. 
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and social life. The pool enables discerning the boundaries between what is lawful and what is 
not. 
 
However, this is not the case with the law of corporate-executive compensation or the 
doctrine of corporate waste. As a result, Disney is essentially the only contemporary corporate-
law case with which to compare the proposed contract-law approach. That is true despite 
occasional compensation packages widely covered in the popular press that draw public outrage. 
Examples include both astonishingly high compensation despite dismal corporate performance
34
 
and lavish executive severance pay in light of events ranging from deep business disappointment 
to the destruction of a company.
35
 It is possible to predict that some of these would fail the test of 
contractual legitimacy described in this Article and be declared unconscionable. 
 
There is also a reported appellate opinion in the case of Richard Grasso, once the CEO of 
the New York Stock Exchange.
36
 He engineered a lavish, one-time payment of $140 million 
from the Exchange when it was a not-for-profit corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the 
office of the New York Attorney General. When that office challenged the payout, it did so 
relying heavily on corporate law principles set out in New York’s not-for-profit corporate statute. 
The New York Court of Appeals, adopting the corporate law viewpoint contained in that statute, 
found that the Attorney General lacked statutory authority to pursue the kinds of corporate law 
claims he asserted. Had the Attorney General and the court thought about the case from a 
contract law perspective, instead of taking a corporate law approach, the opposite result may 
have been possible. 
 
Part I of this Article reviews the three-pronged theoretical logic that spawned the 
skyrocketing of executive pay, especially stock-based pay. It recounts the classical theories of 
optimal contracting, efficient markets, and incentive alignment, and then discusses limitations in 
all three. This synthesis of the literature justifies skepticism about the virtues of prevailing 
executive compensation practices. Part II explains how limited policing of pay contracts 
facilitated their exponential growth despite backfires. It then reviews the new reform agenda to 
fix these problems, identifying persistent shortcomings of the federal statutory and state 
corporate law approaches. Part III celebrates common-law approaches to these challenges, but 
                                                          
34
 Recent reported examples of astonishingly high executive compensation compared to performance include the 
following: (1) Sanjay Jha (Motorola, Inc.), $104.4 million annually during a year when the company’s stock price 
fell 71%; (2) Robert Iger (The Walt Disney Company), $51.1 million annually during a year when the company’s 
profits fell 5% and an amount twice the payment the previous year; and (3) Kenneth Chenault (American Express 
Company), $42.8 million annually during a year when the company’s profits fell 29%. See Kenneth R. Davis, 
Taking Stock—Salary and Options Too: The Looting of Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 420–21 (2010). 
35
 Recent reported examples of lavish severance despite business destruction include: (1) Robert Nardelli (Home 
Depot, Inc.), $210 million, despite mediocre accomplishments during his stormy CEO tenure; (2) Stanley O’Neil 
(Merrill Lynch Co.), $160 million, during the period when 2008’s financial crisis destroyed this once-powerful 
brokerage firm, dooming it to a government-orchestrated takeover by Bank of America; and (3) Charles Prince 
(Citigroup Inc.), $68 million, the year after 2008’s financial crisis decimated the once-mighty financial institution as 
it relied on federal taxpayer bailouts to survive. See Davis, supra note 34, at 422, 460. In Prince’s case, a 
shareholder derivative lawsuit in Delaware challenging the payment as waste survived preliminary challenges and is 
pending. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). If it follows corporate-law 
precedent, the shareholders will lose; if the contract-law analysis proposed in this Article is applied, they have a 
good chance of winning.  
36
 People ex rel. Spitzer v. Grasso, 893 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 2008). 
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notes how corporate law’s waste doctrine is anemic compared to contract law’s 
unconscionability doctrine. 
 
That sets the stage for Part IV’s new legal theory of contractual unconscionability to 
promote judicial review of pay contracts. It encounters and surmounts all the hurdles to show 
how applying contract law to pay contracts, rather than corporate law, would therapeutically and 
incrementally expand the population of contracts that fail the test of judicial legitimacy. This 
new legal theory would thus add considerable value to a field where both federal and state laws 
have failed. In this limited and narrow way, state courts around the country applying their 
contract laws could even add a small but much-needed bit of pressure on Delaware courts to 
heed interests that its traditional corporate law may overlook.  
 
I. THREE PILLARS AND THEIR DIMINISHMENT 
 
Executive compensation, especially stock-based components, has skyrocketed since the 
1990s thanks to a three-pronged theoretical model whose limits were revealed beginning in the 
early 2000s. Part I.A reviews the three theories, and Part I.B demonstrates their limits. 
 
A. CLASSICAL THEORY 
 
The three-pronged theoretical model supporting growing executive compensation, 
especially stock-based components, consisted of a vision of corporate boards forming optimal 
contracts with managers, an assumption that stock market prices are good indicators of 
managerial performance, and a belief that stock-based pay would better align managerial 
incentives with shareholder interests. 
 
1. Optimal Contracting 
 
In optimal contracting theory, shareholders are treated as principals and corporate 
managers as agents.
37
 The theory notes how interests of principals and agents diverge. The costs 
of controlling divergence and of the part that cannot be controlled are called agency costs. In 
corporate contexts, agency costs are limited by markets, including the labor, capital, product and 
corporate control markets.
38
 Divergence of interests between managers and shareholders can be 
reduced by: (a) investing in monitoring devices, such as oversight, auditing, and internal 
controls; (b) using bonding devices, such as commitments not to take certain actions; and (c) 
creating interest-aligning incentives for agents, such as stocked-based pay contracts.
39
 In theory, 
boards of directors, acting for shareholders and being accountable to them, can be counted on to 
reduce agency costs. Compensation contracts that align manager incentives with shareholder 
interests are one method. 
 
2. Efficient Markets 
 
                                                          
37
 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and 
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976). 
38
 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF CORPORATE LAW, ix (1993). 
39
 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 37. 
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To enable boards to reduce agency costs by arrangements that align manager incentives 
with shareholder interests, scholars searched for a proxy to express the shareholder interest and 
then tie manager incentives to it. For centuries, shareholders have been seen as interested in 
maximization of firm profits and managerial performance was evaluated in those terms. 
Beginning in the 1960s, it became fashionable to look beyond those terms to see stock market 
price as a proxy for both the shareholder interest and firm value. This shift arose when theorists 
developed a hypothesis that stock price incorporates all public information about a corporation, 
reflecting profits and value.
40
 
 
The principal–agent model and optimal contracting theory thus found a valuable 
cognate.
41
 This efficient market hypothesis suggested stock prices reflect corporate performance 
so as to provide a report card on managerial stewardship. Higher stock prices signal better 
management.
42
 This assertion pointed to stock-based pay as an incentive device to induce 
managers to focus on stock price, a barometer of their performance.
43
 Stock-based pay could 
reward long-term investor wealth increases, even when focused on current stock price, because 
―stock prices reflect the entire future stream of expected payments to shareholders, discounted to 
present value.‖44 They could extend managerial time horizons to coincide with shareholders’ 
horizons.
45
 
 
3. Incentive Alignment 
 
The idea that stock-based pay may align manager incentives with shareholder interests 
dates back to the 1950s.
46
 But theories of optimal contracting and market efficiency that jelled by 
the 1980s enabled an intensification of this assertion a decade later. This achievement is marked 
by an influential paper by Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy encouraging stock-based pay.
47
 
While recognizing that agency costs are high and many devices, both market and contractual, are 
available to contain such costs, these scholars argued that stock-based pay is most effective to 
align manager incentives and shareholder interests.
48
 
 
                                                          
40 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 
550 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities 
Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761 (1985); Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some 
Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151 (1970). 
41
 Fox, supra note 4, at 2101. 
42
 See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 867 
(1983). 
43
 See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and 
Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 613, 678 (1988). 
44
 William J. Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corporate Control: An Agency Cost 
Model, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 385, 417. 
45
 Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm Specific Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental 
Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 183 n.42. 
46
 See Arthur H. Dean, Employee Stock Options, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1404 (1953). 
47
 Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 
(1990). 
48
 John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 26–27 
(1986). 
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Professors Jensen and Murphy were more concerned with compensation form than 
amounts.
49
 Before they stimulated a shift, cash was the currency of executive compensation, not 
stocks or options. They observed that cash compensation varied little with corporate 
performance, as measured by stock price. They thought this a problem reflected in the agency-
cost model, showing manager–shareholder interests diverging. To limit divergence, and reduce 
agency costs, Jensen and Murphy sought to link pay with performance, measured by stock price. 
That meant making managers into shareholders, and CEOs into substantial shareholders. Stock 
options and other stock-based pay were the solution.
50
  
 
Deeper theory supposes managers are more risk averse
51
 than shareholders.
52
 That is 
because managers have human capital (their earnings potential) tied up in their corporation, and 
human capital is hard to diversify.
53
 Public shareholders have no human capital in the 
corporation and can diversify financial risks by holding investments in many firms. Diversified 
shareholders may prefer managers to pursue risky projects. So portrayed, shareholders have a 
stronger risk appetite than managers, and some aggressive alignment mechanism, like stock-
based pay, was the device to close that divergence.  
 
Managers may also place greater weight on factors that put human capital at risk than on 
financial rewards accompanying successful execution of risky projects. If so, the incentives must 
be sufficiently strong to meet that asymmetric managerial orientation.
54
 The prescription was to 
mirror that orientation with asymmetrical payoffs—alignment devices that affirmatively 
―reward[] success‖ and avoid ―penalizing failure.‖55 Stock options that make managers win big 
on the upside and lose little on the downside became a virtue, providing the asymmetrical 
payoffs their asymmetrical risk appetites warranted. 
 
Most legal scholars avoided overstating the alignment case, noting stock-based pay as 
one device among many to align managerial interests ―more closely‖ with shareholder 
interests.
56
 They could help align these interests, but imperfectly.
57
 Of course, everyone knows 
                                                          
49
 Aleta G. Estreicher, Beyond Agency Costs: Managing the Corporation for the Long Term, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 
513, 609 (1993). 
50
 Jensen & Meckling, supra note 37. 
51
 See Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 
(1979). 
52
 See Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REV. 315, 333 
(1991) (―[M]anagers of large, publicly held firms may be more risk averse than shareholders would prefer.‖). 
53
 See Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin, The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans, 35 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 31, 37–38 (2000). 
54
 Id. at 40 (explaining that their representative analysis of the comparative risk appetites of shareholders and 
managers meant prescribing ―a sufficiently large amount of stock options to offset inclinations to be too risk-
averse‖). 
55
 Id. For some qualification on this prescription, see Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, 
54 HASTINGS L.J. 437, 450 (2003). 
56
 See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 2, at 277–78. Most scholars also knew of the limits of the alignment effects 
of stock options. E.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1490 
(1989) (explaining how the relation of executive compensation to shareholder value is not robust and how stock 
options do not perfectly align manager incentives with shareholder interests). Shareholders lose when price falls, but 
managers do not—a misalignment accentuated by the common practice of boards repricing executive stock options 
down when stock price falls. Stock options cannot align manager–shareholder risk appetites, since firm failure poses 
greater losses to managers than to shareholders, no matter how many stock options they own. The only device that 
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that agency costs cannot be reduced to zero. Stock-option contributions to agency-cost reduction 
cannot be assured, and costs of stock-based pay can exceed the agency-cost reductions they 
achieve. For example, stock options on exercise require share issuances that dilute claims of 
other shareholders.
 
It was understood that stock-based pay could solve some incentive problems 
but create others. 
 
 Even so, there was exuberance among influential corporate law scholars to rivet 
managers on stock price and make it the talisman of corporate performance—and stock-based 
pay was a leading way to do it.
58
 There was also little doubt among prescribers that the primary 
purposes of stock-based pay were to ―motivate management‖ and to ―align‖ recipient–
shareholder interests.
59
 Some said such pay extends managers’ time horizons beyond their 
retirement, a value to the extent shareholder horizons are long.
60
 Though the exact alignment 
function was uncertain, it was always riveted on stock price, creating incentives to ―get stock 
prices up.‖61 This motivation feature did not differ greatly from the alignment thesis, at least so 
long as shareholders shared the ambition to ―get stock prices up.‖62  
 
B. REALITY CHECK 
 
Beginning in the late 1990s and intensifying through the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, reality exposed weaknesses in all three pillars of stock-based pay theory, and concerns 
about skyrocketing executive pay emerged. The optimal contracting model and agency–principal 
accounts work wonderfully in theory, but corporate governance realities make them often 
inaccurate descriptions of the actual state of affairs. Managerial power can be too great in some 
modern U.S. corporations to rely on the model’s envisioned contracting exercises.  
 
The efficient market hypothesis, likewise elegant in theory, is an idealized picture of 
market operation, different from reality. Stock markets produce prices that deviate in sustained 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
could potentially align the two would both compensate managers for success, as stock options were designed to do, 
and punish failure, which they are not designed to do. E.g., Macey, supra note 52, at 333. 
57
 See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., Venture Capital and the Future of Corporate Finance, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 1029, 
1053 (1992) (explaining how stock options ―help[] align the manager’s interests to those of investors‖); Jeffrey N. 
Gordon, The Shaping Force of Corporate Law in the New Economic Order, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 1473, 1490 (1997) 
(―[S]tock option grants . . . help align interests of managers and shareholders.‖). 
58
 E.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The ―Race to the Bottom‖ Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s 
Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919 (1982) (―Various compensation packages such as stock option plans, 
which cause managers to share the risk bearing function with shareholders, provide managers with an incentive to 
maximize shareholders’ wealth and keep stock prices high.‖). 
59
 Carney, supra note 44, at 416. 
60
 Id. 
61
 Thomas & Martin, supra note 53, at 37–38; see also Fischel, supra note 58, at 919 (discussing how market 
mechanisms, such as stock-option plans, are designed to incentivize managers to ―keep stock prices high‖). 
62
 Stock option theory relied heavily not only the theory of efficient markets but also on other aspects of the larger 
body of modern finance theory of which market efficiency is a part. In particular, proponents relied upon a tool of 
modern finance theory to measure stock option value, the famous Black-Scholes option-pricing model. It says option 
values increase in proportion to volatility of stock prices which, in turn, were thought a reliable measure of 
fundamental business risk. Proponents prescribed that managers think about how risky their businesses were in 
terms of how volatile its stock price was—and using stock options to increase their incentives to increase that 
volatility. 
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and substantial ways from any useful expression of underlying corporate performance.
63
 These 
theory–practice discrepancies diminished confidence that stock-based pay would align manager 
incentives with shareholder interests—at least of long-term shareholder interests. They created 
perverse incentives. Any one of these discoveries alone raises doubt about the efficacy of stock-
based pay; their combined effect compounds the problem not only for stock-based pay but for 
the amounts of executive compensation in all forms.  
 
1. Suboptimal Contracting 
 
Managerial power often proved too great for optimal contracting theory to work in 
practice. True, market constraints, contracting devices, stock-exchange voting rules, and 
regulatory and media oversight constrain managerial power to increase agency costs and extract 
lucre from corporations. Managers abusing power to wrest excessive stock-based pay can 
produce shareholder outrage. Shareholder outrage can lead to punishing misbehaving managers 
and using the market for corporate control to oust them, by tender offer or proxy contest. 
Managers may wish to avoid those consequences to protect reputations and associated human 
capital (their earnings potential).  
 
But managers have tools to camouflage misconduct, including thorough control of board 
compensation committees, managing public disclosure, and other obfuscation.
64
 This point is not 
new, of course. Professor Eisenberg highlighted the problem when stock-option alignment 
enthusiasm incubated, along with optimal contracting and the efficient market theory.
65
 He 
explained that only in theory are compensation decisions made by independent committees 
acting on independent outside expert advice.
66
 A corporation’s chief executive officer always has 
a role in picking directors and supporting advisors and can dismiss noncompliant participants. 
The CEO has a clear interest in increasing her or his compensation and that of lieutenants. It 
looks like a governance process at work, but that can be an illusion. 
 
Boards may honestly wish to align managerial incentives with shareholder interests and 
think that stock-based pay does so, tying all to stock price and amounting to a valid exercise of 
business judgment. Boards may likewise follow academic models and grant large numbers of 
options intended to overcome what theory says is a significant difference in manager–
shareholder risk appetites.
67
 But Professors Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker warn of enduring 
illusion in this possibility.
68
 Boards do not always negotiate with senior executives over these 
matters. Optimal contracting theory assumes boards bargain with managers, acting for 
shareholder interests to get optimal contracts. But those assumptions are sometimes wrong. 
 
                                                          
63 E.g., Bainbridge, supra note 7, at 981 & n.129 (―Because shareholders have a long-term investment horizon, they 
would prefer risk-return policies that produce sustainable share price appreciation . . . . [S]tock options may give 
management a short term investment horizon [to boost share price in non-sustainable ways].‖). 
64
 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 29, at 61–79. 
65
 Eisenberg, supra note 56, at 1491–92. 
66
 Id. 
67
 Franklin G. Snyder, More Pieces of the CEO Compensation Puzzle, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 129, 137 (2003). 
68
 Bebchuk, Fried & Walker, supra note 3 at 833. 
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Many scholars credit Professors Bebchuk and Fried with revealing contemporary limits 
of the classical theory of stock-based pay as a solution to the classic agency-cost problem.
69
 For 
example, Professor Stephen Bainbridge, reviewing their book, notes the traditional story 
recounted above calling for reducing agency costs by aligning manager incentives with 
shareholder interests, usually with stock-based pay.
70
 Bainbridge acknowledges that Bebchuk 
and Fried made a good case that those schemes may not work, demonstrating how ―managerial 
influence over the board . . . taints the process‖ and how the system supposed to reduce agency 
costs is itself deeply infected with ―agency costs.‖71 Professor Eisenberg reviews the same 
account, noting stock-based pay as the routine prescription to give managers incentives that align 
with shareholder interests.
72
 He adds that Bebchuk and Fried showed that resulting compensation 
is not linked to performance and concurs about why: ―incumbent CEOs often set their own 
compensation behind a screen of compliant consultants, compliant compensation committees, 
and compliant boards, all largely engaged in blowing smoke.‖73 
 
Not all are convinced by Bebchuk and Fried’s argument that their managerial-power 
thesis is a better way to explain observed practices than optimal contracting theory. Critics say 
there may be good reasons, within optimal contracting theory, for executive compensation to 
result in pay unrelated to business performance.
74
 Other scholars observe that the managerial-
power thesis leaves room for the optimal contracting theory to explain much of observed 
practice.
75
 Some empirical research identifies data suggesting that boards do engage in 
meaningful bargaining with managers.
76
 In response, Bebchuk and Fried emphasize two points: 
(1) the managerial-power thesis supplements, rather than displaces, optimal contracting theory; 
and (2) there should be no presumption that optimal contracting theory is correct so that any rival 
must disprove it to warrant recognition.
77
 On balance, there is at least some reason to doubt 
optimal contracting theory’s utility in practice. 
 
2. Inefficient Markets 
 
                                                          
69
 The problems they identify and associated criticism are of course much older. See Randall S. Thomas & Harwell 
Wells, Executive Compensation in the Courts: Board Capture, Optimal Contracting and Officer Fiduciary Duties 
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 Id. at 1662. 
72
 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Architecture of American Corporate Law: Facilitation and Regulation, 2 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 167, 174–75 (2005). 
73
 Id. at 175. 
74
 John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO Compensation Inefficient Pay Without 
Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142 (2005) (reviewing BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 29). 
75
 Gordon, supra note 1, at 676. 
76
 M. Todd Henderson, Paying CEOs in Bankruptcy: Executive Compensation when Agency Costs Are Low, 101 
NW. U. L. REV. 1543 (2007); M. Todd Henderson, Implicit Compensation (The Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. 
Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 521 (2d Series), 2010), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/521-th-compensation.pdf. 
77
 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 J. CORP. L. 647, 654 
(2005). 
15 
 
Another limit of the classic story is the difference between the efficient-capital-market 
theory and actual stock-market practice.
78
 Even Judge Richard Posner, a longtime, staunch and 
enduring devotee of the efficient-market theory, recognizes considerable limitations on the 
model, which have particularly deleterious effects on stock-based pay.
79
 In discussing stock-
based pay, Posner observed that ―capital markets are not as efficient at pricing securities as the 
best estimate of their companies’ discounted present value as economists and finance theorists 
used to think.‖80 While still believing that efficient-market theory has ―substantial explanatory 
value,‖ Posner reviews insight from behavioral finance casting ―profound‖ doubt on its efficacy 
concerning evaluating executive compensation, especially stock options.
81
  
 
The as-if rationality that efficient-market theory supposes does not hold when investor 
deviations from model behavior are systematic rather than random.
82
 Examples of systematic 
departures from rationality include biases like loss aversion, manifested in greater reluctance to 
sell losing than winning stocks, and demanding a larger risk premium to hold stocks compared to 
bonds than risk models of investment diversification justify. They include excessive trading and 
trading based on perceived stock price patterns. These systemic biases even plague professional 
money managers. Sophisticated arbitrageurs cannot eliminate them since there are not always 
good substitutes for mispriced stocks and there is no assurance that market errors will be 
corrected before an arbitrage position must be closed out. 
 
The result is sustained deviations between stock price and business value. Even if the 
efficient market theory makes more modest claims, like price impounds public information, the 
reality of market behavior impoverishes stock-based pay as a way to tie managerial pay to 
managerial performance or to align managerial incentives with shareholder interests. True, as 
Posner stresses, the force of these deviations is debated and their policy implications contestable. 
But as Poser concludes, existing knowledge supports criticism about the prevailing structure, and 
amount, of executive compensation.
83
 Evidence shows how stock price movements that 
determine compensation ―may not be reliable estimates of underlying values, and hence of 
CEOs’ contribution to those values.‖84 
 
These infirmities in efficient-market theory underscore the difference between the short 
term and long term. The model supposes there is no difference because short-term stock prices, 
impounding all public information, represent a reliable proxy for long-term business value. But 
that is contestable when stock prices are fueled by speculative optimism. Short-term prices can 
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 See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear Genealogy of the 
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 Id. at 1028–29. 
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 Id. at 1036. 
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773–80 (2002). 
83 Posner, supra note 79, at 1036–38. 
84
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be inflated compared to long-term business value.
85
 Based on the technology bubble of the late 
1990s, there is a case that problems with the efficient-market theory make stock-based pay 
problematic, apart from the relative accuracy of optimal contracting theory versus the 
managerial-power thesis. It is possible, amid inefficient market bubbles, that shareholder 
interests are so riveted on short-term stock price that short-term, stock-based pay perfectly aligns 
shareholder–manager interests—though short-term price and long-term value differ.86 
 
But what of shareholders not interested in short-term price drops compared to long-term 
business value? There may be a stalemate between proponents of the classical theories 
supporting stock-based pay and those emphasizing reality checks. Proponents still hold out hope 
for tenets such as optimal contracting and efficient markets while skeptics stress the inherent 
limits of these models. Assuming shareholder interest promotion is the goal, it is vital whether 
the contending position can even agree about which shareholder interests matter.
87
 Shareholders 
may be arrayed on a highly delineated range of time horizons, from minute-to-minute short-term 
day traders fastened on price fluctuations to long-term devotees of fundamental value. The 
populations may vary with different corporations and economic climates. With efficient markets, 
this short-term–long-term dichotomy would not exist. But with imperfectly efficient markets, the 
difference can be vast.  
 
That difference, along with managerial incentives to fasten on short-term price, rather 
than long-term value, has spawned three problems, which will be analyzed in the next Subpart as 
evidence of misaligned incentives: inclining managers to speculative short-term projects that 
sacrifice long-term investment, encouraging earnings manipulation and accounting fraud, and 
overdoing stock repurchases as opposed to paying cash dividends. None of those should be 
possible if stock markets are efficient, where stock price reflects all public information and are 
proxies for corporate or managerial performance. Even erstwhile, champions of stock-based pay, 
and the efficient-market theory used to justify it, see that stock prices can be inflated.
88
 
Accordingly, it is no longer correct to say that stock-based pay pinned to the short term gives 
managers incentives to increase shareholder or corporate value; rather, it gives them incentives to 
increase short-term stock price.  
 
3. Misaligned Incentives 
 
It seems relatively widely recognized that stock-based pay does not always work as well 
to align manager incentives with shareholder interests as the theory predicted.
89
 It creates three 
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perverse incentives for managers not aligned with the interests of shareholders other than 
speculative short-term ones. The first and most-cited problem is that stock-based pay riveted 
manager attention on current stock price, not long-term business value. In contrast, the interests 
of most shareholders focus on long-term business value, not short-term stock price.
90
 Second, the 
result of that fixation is managerial temptation towards manipulation and distorting financial 
records and accounting, thus skewing information in ways antagonistic to most shareholder 
interests.
91
 Third, the incentives also slant managers away from paying cash dividends to 
stockholders and towards stock repurchases because dividends are not paid on stock options and 
cash repurchases drive up stock price.
92
 That likewise may be an interest shared by some, but not 
all, shareholders.  
 
These problems arise in part because of poor pay contract design. For example, 
misalignment occurs when stock options make managerial upside potential enormous and 
downside risk minimal.
93
 Stock options either pay off big or expire worthless, costing managers 
little on the downside and encouraging greater risk taking than many shareholders prefer. Even 
when stock prices fall below set exercise prices, the once-common board practice of cutting the 
exercise price—or issuing new options—creates value for option-holding managers not available 
to any shareholder. That undercuts manager–shareholder-interest alignment.94 
 
Options vest within a few years and can be exercised upon vesting for up to ten years, 
and managers tend promptly to liquidate them within the short term. The shorter the time until 
stock options vest and become exercisable, the shorter managerial focus becomes. At brief 
intervals, options ―turbocharge‖ managerial fixation on short-term price that can misalign 
manager–shareholder interests on time horizons and, worse, induce pathological managerial 
obsession with stock price.
95
 That tempts managers not only to succumb to financial 
misreporting and slanted capital allocations but creates incentives for them to manipulate the 
timing of disclosure to shareholders—disclosing news likely to reduce stock price right before 
exercise prices are set and disclosing news likely to increase stock price right before exercising. 
 
Several categories of costs arise from these misalignments. First, stock-based pay is more 
costly than an equivalent amount of cash for a corporation.
96
 To a manager, the choice between 
one million dollars in cash and stock options with an estimated value of one million dollars is 
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easy—take the cash, since it offers liquidity and a certain value while the stock option is illiquid 
and of uncertain value. Second, the devices shift claims on corporate value from shareholders to 
managers, evidenced by the dilution of other shareholders when managers exercise options for 
shares. Third, any resulting financial misreporting, fraud, or disclosure manipulation risks capital 
misallocations. Fourth, pay contracts can inject volatility into stock market prices, skewing what 
could be a useful signal of corporate performance, as under efficient-market theory.
97
  
 
Accordingly, it is difficult to embrace the alignment thesis of stock-based pay contracts. 
That is due to design that rivets managerial attention on the short-term and skewed incentives 
towards financial manipulation. It is also difficult because it is impossible to delineate a 
particular sort of shareholder with which any alignment prescription can be made.  
 
II. FROM NEGLECT TO REFORM 
 
Executive pay has skyrocketed along with stock-based components. From the 1980s to 
early 2000s, there was essentially no bulwark against excess. With the empirical discovery of 
limitations on the model, the new reform agenda offers many proposals to fill this gap. The 
following reviews the historical lack of oversight and highlights some approaches to providing it, 
including partial reforms appearing in the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, prescribing independent 
director oversight of top pay contracts, enhanced disclosure, and periodic but nonbinding 
shareholder votes on them.  
 
A. LIMITED HISTORICAL POLICING 
 
Academics on balance supported growth in executive pay, especially stock-based 
components, with only a minority of scholars raising serious doubt.
98
 Many boards of directors 
became supine and compliant, increasingly relying upon outside executive-compensation 
consultants and benchmarking against peers in exercises that ratcheted up executive pay, 
especially stock option components.  
 
At best, state corporate law, in Delaware
99
 or elsewhere,
100
 provided limited supervision. 
Delaware, in particular, had shifted its standard for judicial review of executive compensation 
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from something resembling serious examination to the most deferential position possible.
101
 This 
relaxed waste standard, combined with the business judgment rule, veneration of formal board 
independence, and the endorsement of special litigation committees in derivative litigation, took 
Delaware courts and corporate law largely out of the policing picture.
102
 This relaxation 
coincided with growing recognition that Delaware no longer competed with other states in the 
market for corporate charters, so that its production of corporate law was not necessarily 
constrained by competition from other states.
103
  
At the federal level, securities regulators’ efforts resulted only in mandating more 
disclosure (a feature continued in the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010).104 While potentially useful, 
some of these rules, such as requiring comparisons of compensation at peer companies, made the 
practice of benchmarking more tempting and contributed to pay ratcheting up. Tax policy, 
though occasionally ambivalent, created additional incentives for corporations to use stock-based 
pay, rather than perform any policing function.
105
 Even the Sarbanes–Oxley Act,106 responding 
to scandals of the early 2000s with some link to stock-based pay, did nothing to address 
problems of misaligned incentives arising from inefficient markets and suboptimal 
contracting.
107
 Though some scholars contend that the declining competition for Delaware from 
other states has been replaced by an enduring threat of preemption from the federal 
government,
108
 these modest incursions are slight,
109
 and Delaware retains enormous leeway in 
designing corporate law for national use.  
As stock-based pay began to proliferate, it was an accident of accounting history that 
standards did not require stock options to be treated as an expense on an income statement. That 
treatment contributed to corporate America’s appetite for using this form of compensation. In 
response, accounting standard setters sought to require recording option compensation as 
expenses, but business interests and politicians in Congress resisted mightily.
110
 After a decades 
of fighting and the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, standard setters achieved some reporting 
transparency. But that happened after stock-based pay had penetrated corporate culture so 
pervasively that the measures were too little too late to offer much of a policing function. As a 
group, auditors did not keep up with the inherent risks of earnings management that stock-based 
pay created. Many were co-opted by management.
111
 
                                                          
101
 See Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997) (tracing the rise and decline of the doctrine of waste to 
police pay contracts). 
102
 Part III elaborates these points, noting the occasional but partial and limited judicial rebuke. 
103
 E.g., Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN. L. REV. 679 
(2002). 
104
 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111–203, §§ 952–955, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1900–05 (2010). That Act also calls for enhanced independent director oversight and non-binding shareholder 
votes, as noted in the next part. 
105
 See James R. Repetti, The Misuse of Tax Incentives to Align Management–Shareholder Interests, 19 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 697, 701 (1997). 
106
 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 
& 29 U.S.C.). 
107
 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes–Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just 
Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003). 
108
 E.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003). 
109
 Cunningham, supra note 107. 
110
 See Calvin H. Johnson, Accounting in Favor of Investors, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 637 (1997). 
111
 See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 322–30 (2006). 
20 
 
 With no legal oversight of executive compensation, the combination of public outrage, 
media pressure, and financial crisis that began in 2008 conspired to sharpen attention on the 
question. That induced some market correction, suggested by evidence of changes in stock-
based-pay practices at some companies.
112
 Examples include increased used of contract 
provisions requiring disgorging amounts later deemed excessive under so-called ―claw-back‖ 
provisions.
113
 Some see the incremental shift in board practices as a sign of a self-correcting 
governance program.
114
 Some scholars discern a flicker of a move within Delaware corporate 
law in response,
115
 focusing on officer fiduciary duties, though this remains inchoate.
116
 As 
discussed next, a new reform agenda emerged from this public outrage, leading to a few new 
provisions addressing executive compensation in the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010, but leaving much 
of the agenda incomplete and sustaining, rather than resolving, the debate. 
 
B. THE NEW REFORM AGENDA 
 
The three-pronged theoretical logic that promoted skyrocketing executive compensation, 
including its stock-based components, is under renovation. Optimal contracting theory retains 
supporters who believe that boards are self-correcting, though others prescribe greater disclosure 
or expanding shareholder voice in corporate governance. Most seem to agree that there are 
differences between short-term price and long-term value, and that stock-based pay should be 
redesigned to emphasize the latter. Many still believe in the possibility of using stock-based pay 
to align manager incentives with shareholder interests. But that prospect’s dubiousness opens up 
new ways to justify the device. An alternative is that stock-based pay can be valuable to 
corporations to attract and retain scarce executive talent. The following discusses leading aspects 
of each point, drawing two implications. The first is whether the surgery on stock-based-pay 
redesign will prove worthwhile or whether a better prescription is to abolish it.
117
 The second, 
recognizing abolition as unlikely both practically and politically, is the continuing absence of 
judicial scrutiny of stock-based pay, to which Part III of this Article turns. 
 
1. Reoptimizing Contracting 
 
An early prescription to police stock-based pay was offered by Greaf Crystal, a 
compensation expert, who suggested corporate boards use independent consultants and 
compensation committees staffed with fully informed independent directors.
118
 Though scholars 
continue to debate whether observed pay practices comport with optimal contracting theory or 
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the managerial-power thesis, there is little doubt that merely having such consultants and 
committees does not promote an air-tight arrangement in which actual bargaining occurs. It is 
not obvious that continuing to emphasize board independence in a formal legal sense promotes 
serious arm’s-length contracting, given the variety of structural, cognitive, and other biases that 
make directors more sympathetic and accountable to senior executives than to public 
shareholders.
119
 Accordingly, new provisions in the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 prescribing 
independent-board-committee oversight of top-executive pay, while potentially incrementally 
helpful, are not highly likely to succeed.
120
 
Reinvigorating the optimal contracting story requires intensifying the accountability of 
directors engaged in compensation setting. They must have incentives, aligned with stockholder 
interests, to conduct arm’s-length bargaining. That leads to a standard prescription to increase 
shareholder voice in the boardroom. The Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 takes an incremental step of 
requiring periodic shareholder votes on top pay, though these are expressly not binding and do 
not expressly alter board fiduciary duties.
121
 While this process may increase visibility of pay 
and intensify board oversight, the precatory nature of the vote and its infrequency may dull its 
teeth. 
 
Enhanced disclosure is the standard approach to reforming securities regulation generally 
and executive compensation practices in particular.
122
 The Dodd–Frank Act increases disclosure 
to address academic criticism and public outrage concerning executive compensation. Regarding 
academic criticism, Dodd–Frank requires disclosure relating executive pay to enterprise 
performance, a clarion cry of pay critics for a decade.
123
 Regarding public outrage, the Act 
requires stating and relating in a ratio the amounts of the CEO’s pay to the pay of the company’s 
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median worker.
124
 Companies also must disclose whether top executives owning company stock 
are allowed to hedge against declines in the stock price.
125
 This is important because even stock-
based pay designed to induce optimal incentives can be circumvented with hedges.  
 
This tried-and-true approach to corporate regulation using disclosure is heralded by 
some.
126 Indeed, there has long been extensive disclosure of pay contracts and other executive-
compensation arrangements, including the terms of stock-option plans. But these can be buried 
in dense documents or reams of paper that only a handful of market professionals digest. That 
may be enough to make the information public within the meaning of efficient-market theory and 
reflected in stock price. But disclosure serves additional functions, including as a check on board 
and management, generating outrage when pay is exorbitant and thus deterring excess.
127
 A new 
disclosure rule in the Dodd–Frank Act expressing the ratio of top to median pay at a company 
may inflame public outrage and may provide that check. 
128
 
 
 Or the rule could backfire. For example, spotlighting the ratio of top-to-median pay may 
have surprising political repercussions. It may merely intensify existing polarity in the populace 
dividing those outraged by great income disparities between workers and managers and those 
who assume big pay rewards hard work. It is not always possible to use graphic or narrative 
information relating pay to performance and the result may be less meaningful than it sounds. In 
fact, other proponents of disclosure as a tonic prescribed disclosing very different information. 
They would require greater detail concerning the degree to which pay contracts are designed to 
orient managers on shorter versus longer-term horizons.
129
 Furthermore, of course, the limits of 
public corporate disclosure are well known and it is infeasible to compel effective disclosure of 
all useful information.
130
 Ultimately, critics counter that vesting more power in shareholders will 
exacerbate—not solve—problems created by stock option short-term riveting because some 
influential shareholders prefer the short-term focus.
131
 
 
 Whatever value Dodd–Frank may add, and appreciating how controversial even these 
incremental steps are, it is notable that Congress chose a few among many of a broader range of 
reform proposals in circulation. These include giving shareholders access to the corporate 
director ballot (something the Act merely directs the SEC to evaluate), increasing their power to 
remove directors, eliminating staggered boards, and increasing shareholder power to amend 
corporate charters and by-laws establishing corporate-governance procedures.
132
 Some call for 
making proxy fights easier for shareholders to wage
133
 by reimbursing them for expenses, just as 
corporations absorb expenses of managerial proxy campaigns. The Dodd–Frank Act left these 
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more rigorous exercises out. It remains to be seen what the SEC will do about shareholder proxy 
access. But whatever the SEC does, it can have at most an indirect effect on executive pay. 
 
Yet others say increasing marginal income-tax rates on high-income earners, targeted to 
stock-based pay, would police these contracts more effectively.
134
 That may be true. But that 
prescriptive approach has a long pedigree.
135
 And Congress has done precisely the opposite in its 
tax laws, encouraging stock-based pay under the rubric of ―incentive compensation.‖136 Political 
pressure against changing that law makes it unwise to rely upon Congressional action.  
 
 A final reform suggestion equips independent and impartial arbiters with power to review 
pay contracts for legitimacy. Federal law did that for banks receiving bailout funds during the 
financial crisis, enlisting Kenneth R. Feinberg to set the pay of twenty-five top managers at 
seven companies. The Dodd–Frank Act comes close to that for a small group of large banks, 
requiring federal-bank regulators to prohibit contingent-pay arrangements that can yield 
excessive compensation or risk material bank losses.
137
 Corporations could also create 
shareholder compensation committees to serve this role.
138
  
 
It is possible to imagine ways of reforming Delaware corporate law and stimulating 
Delaware’s judiciary to provide this supervision, especially a newly found focus on the fiduciary 
duties of officers themselves as distinct from directors.
139
 Yet Delaware’s law regulating 
shareholder suits precludes many claims, and its corporate law of director duties and waste has 
not offered a rigorous forum for judicial review. The judicial-scrutiny avenue should not be 
neglected, however, and Part III of this Article offers the corrective of substantive contract-law 
review conducted by courts other than Delaware’s, in addition to whatever reinvigoration of 
Delaware corporate law courts may adopt. 
 
2. Retention as the Goal. 
 
Many scholars continue to hope that properly designed stock-based pay can help align 
managerial incentives with shareholder interests, especially of long-term shareholders.
140
 
Experience casts doubt about such hopes, however. True, the Dodd–Frank Act’s enhanced board 
independence, shareholder voting, and disclosure imply probable boardroom changes are 
indicated. Some boards may learn from past mistakes. But that is not inevitable. In the academic 
literature, the primary rationale offered for stock-based pay was aligning manager incentives 
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with shareholder interests. If that were the only rationale, and if the hopeful are wrong and there 
is less realistic chance that stock-based pay can provide such alignment, there would be a strong 
case for abolishing stock-based pay.
141
  
 
Alternatively, stock-based pay can be justified on grounds other than alignment and 
debate over its capacity to promote alignment rendered moot. Even while academics emphasized 
alignment as the rationale, companies using stock-based pay declared their purpose as attracting 
and retaining managers.
142
 Many managers come to command extraordinary information about 
an enterprise, and many are intensely interested in lateral moves.
143
 Retaining them can be 
valuable to a corporation and its shareholders. There may be few better ways to induce retention 
than dangling valuable stock options that vest in the future.
144
 Before the stock-based pay boom 
that began in the 1990s, the principal rationale of stock-based pay dating to the 1950s was 
executive retention.
145
 
 
Though recognizing the retention rationale, some stock-based pay skeptics doubt its 
utility for that purpose. They note that competing companies outbid the value of equity interests 
left on the table by inducing managers to move through the device of the ―golden hello.‖146 Some 
companies give stock options after terminating an executive, not to retain or align.
147
 Still, it 
appears increasingly clear that corporate managers and scholars alike consider the rationale of 
attraction and retention to be more legitimate and credible for stock-based pay than the 
debilitated alignment rationale. 
 
3. Long Term, Not Short Term 
 
Following the consensus that stock-based pay failures of recent decades were due to 
perverse riveting on short-term stock price, an equal consensus appears to reform the device to 
focus on long-term business value. Professor Bratton notes that the three largest subcategories of 
costs stock-based pay poses from its short-term riveting (deferred investment, earnings 
management, and excessive share buybacks compared to dividends) can be mitigated by ―[l]ong-
term restraints on the alienation of equity awards.‖148 Judge Posner proposes requiring ―that a 
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substantial share of executive compensation be backloaded and tied to the future performance of 
the firm.‖149 
 
This prescription has a long pedigree.
150
 As discussed above, criticism of stock-based pay 
focuses heavily on its short-term rivet effect, implying that redesign for the long-term would be a 
fitting remedy.
151
 There may be reason to believe that boards will act on the recommendation and 
adhere to a long-term design focus faithfully. The information environment has changed. Boards 
know the limits of the alignment thesis and limits of stock market pricing. They know the 
perverse incentives that short-term stock-based pay creates. It may be helpful to give 
shareholders more influence over boards to promote accountability and fidelity to the new 
reform agenda’s focus on long-term pay contracts. But it is vital to appreciate that shareholders 
are not homogenous and the slogan of ―empowering shareholders‖ overlooks how different the 
interests of different shareholders can be, ranging from those interested in minute-by-minute 
stock price changes to those interested in intrinsic value measured years into the future.  
 
In light of these concerns in the new reform agenda, leading scholars such as Professors 
Bebhuk and Fried and Professor Romano prescribe an integrated redesign of pay contracts. All 
struggle to promote long-term manager orientations. For example, historically, stock options 
have usually vested within a couple of years and are immediately exercisable then. That fixes 
attention on the short term. But there is no reason the vesting and exercisability have to happen 
simultaneously.
152
 Options could vest after three years, providing pay and retention incentives. 
But they could be made exercisable for the stock only years after vesting. Managers would have 
less incentive to rivet on short-term stock price and more in stock price years later. The required 
time before exercisability should be predetermined and lengthy. It should not be a function of 
events that a manager can control, like a recipient’s retirement.153 That would rivet attention on 
stock price during the preretirement period, sustaining all known problems with such short-term 
focus. Equally bad, it can encourage premature retirement, defeating the newly important 
retention rationale of stock-based pay.
154
  
 
Redesign must lengthen managerial time horizons but appreciate managerial needs for 
liquidity and diversification. Long-term alienation restraints lengthen managerial horizons, 
reducing incentives to focus on short-term price. But restraints lower stock-option value to 
managers by reducing liquidity and capacity for diversification. Too much equity from 
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excessively tight constraints makes managers too undiversified compared to many outside 
shareholders; too little makes the recipient a mere ―implicit debt holder,‖ reliant on the firm for 
salary, with incentives to reduce risk.
155
 A modulated restraints–release design pursues the 
optimal by combining long-term constraints with periodic releases.
156
 An alternative would 
impose long-term restraints in exchange for granting more stock options to increase aggregate 
value to recipients. But that raises the specter of further upward pressure on total 
compensation.
157
 Another alternative would impose minimum equity holdings. Yet that can 
exacerbate the problem because when too high, managers may be more risk-averse than many 
outside diversified shareholders prefer.
158
 
 
If separating the vesting and exercisability dates and capping periodic option exercises 
were the only redesign changes made, problems would remain for incentives managers have to 
time and manage the terms of grant dates and exercise dates. Managers picking grant and 
exercise dates exploit inside information and even shape disclosure policy to influence stock 
price, reducing it just before grant dates and raising it just before exercise dates.
159
 To prevent 
this mischief requires eliminating associated discretion and current timing practices.
160
 
Eliminating discretion over grant exercise dates would curtail managers abusing information 
advantages. Proponents of stock-based pay concur that long-term alienation restraints reduce 
managerial temptation to manipulate short-term stock price.
161
 Locking in grant dates and 
restricting discretion over exercise programs reinforce that benefit. It is more difficult to 
manipulate information flows under these constraints and more difficult to manipulate long-term 
than short-term accounting and stock-price effects.
162
 
 
But these restrictions will not eliminate the potential for incentives for financial or 
accounting manipulation, though they would moderate them and their significance. It may be 
more difficult to manipulate information and accounting results over long periods than short 
periods, but it is possible. Familiar gimmicks to manipulate short-term results, to boost current 
profits, include premature revenue recognition and capitalization of expenses. That reduces 
profits reported later. An efficient stock market should see through such charades; actual stock 
markets do not. But a shift to the medium or long term, especially by staggering the alienability 
of stock options, only shifts the game’s focus. For example, if stock-option values peak in year 
six, managers have an incentive to allocate profits to year six. Schedules of revenue recognition 
and expense allocation can be devised to facilitate just that. The staggered release schedule may 
reduce this manipulation incentive, but it cannot eliminate it. 
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162
 See Merritt B. Fox, Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What To Do, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1089, 1096 (2008). 
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Many other problems and proposed solutions appear, and delineating them all is beyond 
this Article’s scope. But highlighting one will suffice to illustrate the challenge and stimulate 
thought concerning whether to abolish stock-based pay or at least develop a way to adapt a basic 
contract-law doctrine to police them. Vital to any redesign is a device to prevent managerial 
evasion of intended effects. Whatever design stock-based pay assumes and whatever alignment, 
retention, or other virtues are provided, managers can use side deals to reverse the effects. 
Managers can engage in short sales or sign-swap agreements that have the effect of liquidating or 
altering the position equity interests ordinarily represent. Even stock-pay proponents who 
generally favor market and private solutions to governance challenges suggest willingness to 
prescribe that law ban such end-runs.
163
 That consensus explains provisions in the Dodd–Frank 
Act that require companies to disclose whether managers owning stock are permitted to hedge 
against stock price declines.
164
 But that disclosure is not the same thing as a policy prohibiting it, 
of course.  
 
C. THE CASE FOR ABOLITION 
 
The new reform agenda’s emphasis on stock-based-pay-contract redesign amounts to 
radical surgery that raises a separate question: whether these devices are worth redesigning or 
whether they should be abolished. To read some accounts of stock-based pay, it’s a wonder how 
corporations achieved prosperity for the hundreds of years before it was so well theorized that 
they proliferated throughout corporate America. Yet, are they vital? Would corporate America or 
the U.S. economy be worse off without these devices? Berkshire Hathaway, run by noted 
investor–manager Warren Buffett, has never paid managers using stocks or options, and that 
company is among the largest and most-respected in the world.
165
 Is abolishing stock-based pay, 
voluntarily by corporations or mandatorily by regulation, a damnable prescription? Setting aside 
the political obstacles to any such prescription, it’s worth pausing to consider just how vital 
stock-based pay is, especially for retention, now that it assumes greater importance as a credible 
rationale. What are the alternatives and how do they compare in complexity and cost?  
 
Several devices readily present themselves as retention tools—and some may promote 
alignment as well or better than stock options or the like. For senior executives, including CEOs, 
examples are cash salary and other compensation (like cash bonuses, pension, and severance), 
plus non-compete agreements. For other top managers, the devices include opportunities for 
advancement, staffing and reporting arrangements, and titles. All these can be designed to 
promote retention, and some can even be designed to help align managerial incentives with 
shareholder interests, such as by making some bonuses tied to business-unit performance under 
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 Thomas & Martin, supra note 53, at 46 (―[T]he government could prohibit executives from using derivative 
instruments as a way of realizing immediate value on their stock options.‖). 
164
 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 955, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1904–05 (2010). 
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 See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT: LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA 65–74 
(2d ed. 2008). Berkshire Hathaway is iconoclastic in corporate America in many ways, of course. These include 
having a single individual as controlling shareholder, never having paid a dividend, not splitting its stock for 
decades, and for decades using a shareholder program to allocate charitable giving. Id. Even so, on these and other 
points, that is why the company can teach corporate America such valuable lessons, including on stock options. 
28 
 
that manager’s control. Most are relatively cheap compared to stock-based pay. They are also 
simpler in that they present fewer risks of creating unintended perverse incentives. 
 
 Opponents of abolition, including Judge Posner, note that stock-based pay can provide 
some alignment effects, though they were oversold and are a ―clumsy instrument for 
incentivizing managers.‖166 Abolitionists emphasize those weak alignment benefits, the 
irredeemably impaired contracting process, and how riveting on shareholder wealth, short or 
long term, has ―corrosive effects.‖167 Even the best redesign proposals show that no stock-based 
pay contract will avoid presenting trade-offs and complexities. Designing effective pay contracts 
is a Herculean task because of inherent trade-offs.  
As Professor Bratton explains, these trade-offs arise because stock-based pay is not 
sensible if conceived of merely as compensation.
168
 For corporations and shareholders, 
compensation, in whatever amount, is cheaper using cash than stock. Stock-based pay must offer 
something more than return for labor. It must provide incentives cash does not. In the standard 
story, those unique incentives are some form of alignment between managerial and shareholder 
interests. Yet those incentives can only be maximized by imposing long-term alienation 
restraints that reduce managerial assessments of option value. The upshot is inherent trade-offs. 
 
An important incentive that affects stock-based pay can provide better than cash is to 
induce managers to remain employed. Boards that design stock-based pay solely for the purpose 
of retention can skip the incentives alignment angst and set the level and form of options as 
required to induce valuable managers to stick around, keeping their human capital in place. 
Although that provides a more credible rationale to continue to use stock-based pay, and against 
abolition, it does not eliminate difficulties or trade-offs. Even if the purpose is to give managers 
an incentive to remain with the corporation, effects can be a variety of other skewed incentives. 
Changing the rationale does not change the device or related design challenges. But it does 
support changing the conception of the legal lens used to evaluate option-pay legitimacy—a shift 
from corporate law to contract law. 
 
III. OLD AND NEW COMMON-LAW TOOLS 
 
One disadvantage to statutory or regulatory responses to corporate-governance challenges 
is their inherently one-size-fits-all quality. Whether in the original securities-law statutes or 
updates like Sarbanes–Oxley or Dodd–Frank, Congress adopts laws of general applicability. 
That is true whether they work better or worse for the wide variety of corporate settings they 
address. Broad general principles like disclosure and materiality work well under such a model. 
But more intricate matters, such as control and supervision of accounting systems or 
compensation packages, are less amenable to that kind of regulation. Apart from potentially 
awkward fit and costliness, the result is a watering down of a law’s strength that misses the target 
of the most egregious abuses. In contrast, common law’s case-by-case approach is precisely 
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 Posner, supra note 79, at 1044 (―Stock options should not be forbidden, as they do have some tendency to align 
managerial compensation with firm performance.‖); see also Walker, supra note 129 (critiquing recent executive-
compensation regulations). 
167
 Melone, supra note 93, at 536, 562–63. 
168
 Bratton, supra note 87, at 57–59. 
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targeted and tailored. It catches the egregious cases and yields to the wide range of legitimate 
practices. 
 
Another advantage of common law is how it usually generates a population of resolved 
cases that enables stating doctrines that show the boundaries between legal categories, including 
between what is legitimate and what is unlawful. The corporate doctrine of waste does not share 
that feature, especially not concerning executive-compensation decisions. The cases all suggest 
that essentially anything goes, and that does not yield a useful body of case law. If contract-
unconscionability law applied, a body of cases with some variety would emerge, with some 
bargains found illegal while the majority would be upheld. The population of cases would draw 
on and reflect legitimate business and legal norms, which lawyers and business people would in 
turn use to make lawful arrangements and eschew unlawful ones. In short, the common law of 
contracts has a capacity to target and catch what is unmatched by federal securities statutes or 
state corporation law. 
 
This Part paves the way to the Article’s proposal by exploring the doctrines of waste and 
unconscionability. It shows that, in theory, corporate law’s waste doctrine should be more 
demanding than contract’s unconscionability doctrine but that the reverse is true in practice. 
Discussion then reconciles the two doctrines and shows the appeal of contract law to test the 
legitimacy of pay contracts. The next Part explicates the route to make that happen and illustrates 
the opposing results. 
 
A. CORPORATE WASTE 
 
Corporate law vests all powers, including the hiring and compensation of officers, in the 
board of directors,
169
 with occasional requirements or opportunities for shareholder input.
170
 
Boards owe corporations and their shareholders duties of care, presumed discharged under the 
business judgment rule, and of loyalty, easily met by satisfying formal independence 
requirements.
171
 Corporate-law judges defer overwhelmingly to board decisions within their 
statutory powers. In theory, boards are not authorized to engage in transactions that constitute a 
waste of corporate assets, though in practice, judicial findings of corporate waste are rare.
172
 
Even when palpable waste appears, corporate law insulates related decisions from judicial 
review by limiting shareholder power to assert legal rights on behalf of the corporation.
173
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 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (West 2006); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2007). 
170
 Federal law also may require or create incentives for shareholder voice, under both securities and tax law. Federal 
income-tax law grants special treatment to certain kinds of pay contracts if approved by a shareholder vote. See 
I.R.C. § 162(m)(1) (2006) (allowing corporate tax deductions for employee compensation above $1 million only if it 
qualifies as performance-based compensation); id. § 162(m)(4)(C)(ii) (providing that performance-based pay plans 
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 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31. 
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 Even well-respected Delaware judges have quipped about the rarity, one equating belief in its very existence to 
belief in the existence of the Loch Ness Monster, see Steiner v. Meyerson, No. 13139, 1995 WL 441999, at * 5 (Del. 
Ch. July 19, 1995), and another prescribing its abolition as a discarded vestige of a primitive era, see Harbor Fin. 
Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879 (Del. Ch. 1999). 
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 These limitations on shareholder litigation are discussed infra text accompanying notes 291–315. 
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A successful claim that a corporate payment constitutes waste, and is therefore 
unprotected by the business judgment rule, requires a showing ―that no reasonable [business 
person] could find that adequate consideration had been supplied for the payment.‖174 In 
practice, that test requires showing the functional equivalent of a gift of corporate assets.
175
 
Examples are monthly installment payments to a corporation’s former president’s wife because 
the payments were gratuitous,
176
 generating nothing for the corporation in return and motivated 
solely by sentiment. Similarly, naked bonuses that amount to retroactive salary increases lack 
consideration absent terms limiting payments according to achieving contract-like objectives.
177
 
 
As a result of functionally equating waste with gifts, massive salaries are outside the 
doctrine of waste because they so easily meet a long-standing test the Supreme Court stated in 
1933 that defines ―waste‖ as occurring when there is ―no relation‖ between what the corporation 
gives and gets.
178
 Delaware courts have generally followed this statement of the doctrine of 
corporate waste.
179
 Even the strictest Delaware Supreme Court opinions, written in the 1950s 
(and since fallen into desuetude), did not require much.
180
 Examples, both focused on stock-
option pay, suggest the corporation must receive something in exchange and that stock options 
exercisable quickly after issuance that do not require continuing employment fail that test.
181
 But 
even such a test can readily be satisfied by showing some relationship between value given and 
benefit received
182
 or, even easier, relying upon approval by a disinterested board coupled with 
shareholder ratification.
183
  
 
Whether under that old standard or current articulations, it is difficult for shareholders to 
win claims of corporate waste in any context, including executive compensation. It is nearly 
impossible to assert waste as a basis to challenge a merger
184
 or a corporation’s dividend 
policy.
185
 Even as to compensation claims, success is rare when adequate consideration can be 
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 Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739 (7th Cir. 1979). 
175
 Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 335–36 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
176
 Adams v. Smith, 153 So. 2d 221, 225–26 (Ala. 1963). Notably, this was a derivative action asserting that the 
transfers were ultra vires. See infra Part IV.A.3. 
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 Hurt v. Cotton States Fertilizer Co., 159 F.2d 52, 58 (5th Cir. 1947). 
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 Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582, 591–92 (1933); see also McQuillen v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 27 F. Supp. 639, 
653–55 (D. Md. 1939) (distinguishing between excessive compensation in stock-option case, which it called legal, 
and wasteful compensation; which it said was illegal, and finding mere excess), aff’d, 112 F.2d 877 (4th Cir. 1940); 
Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 673 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941) (exhaustive examination of exorbitant pay upheld on 
grounds the court lacked competency to resolve problems of excessive executive compensation). 
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 Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731, 735–37 (Del. 1960).  
180
 See Yablon, supra note 21, at 1902–04 (discussing the cases cited here). 
181
 Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 99 A.2d 507, 510–12 (Del. 1953); Kerbs v. Cal. E. Airways, 90 A.2d 652, 656–
68 (Del. 1952). 
182
 Lieberman v. Becker, 155 A.2d 596, 598 (Del. 1959) (citing Kerbs, 90 A.2d at 657). 
183
 Beard, 160 A.2d at 737. 
184
 Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 890–95 (Del. Ch. 1999). In theory, a merger or other business 
combination approved at a price vastly lower than the corporation’s intrinsic value could amount to a gift of the 
excess value. Yet valuation is a notoriously judgment-laden exercise and so mounting a successful challenge on 
grounds of a gift would be nearly impossible. Likewise, elaborate procedures for approving a merger are prescribed 
in corporate law statutes, which almost always require board and shareholder approval or provide dissenting 
shareholder appraisal rights. 
185
 Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 387 N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1976). It is possible for a distribution of corporate assets to deliver less value to shareholders than they could have 
obtained using other approaches. Consider a board decision to distribute assets, such as investment securities that 
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found solely from the possibility that an executive may in the future be available to provide 
consulting services to the corporation.
186
  
 
Corporate law’s reluctance to invoke the doctrine of waste is due, in part, to its 
veneration of procedural aspects of board decisionmaking.
187
 This orientation is reflected in the 
heavy reliance on the business judgment rule and asserted judicial incapacity to evaluate the 
substantive fairness of corporate exchange. Judges may have a comparative competency to 
evaluate the procedural integrity of corporate dealmaking. So even a massive payout to an 
executive, substantively suspect, can be insulated from judicial review by procedural steps like 
using independent outside consultants, giving directors briefing books about the background and 
terms of the exchange, and getting approval of disinterested and fully informed directors and/or 
shareholders. That is so despite deficiencies in the bargaining process boards and managers 
sometimes use when establishing stock-based pay
188
 and well-known infirmities of shareholder 
voting.
189
  
 
B. CONTRACTUAL UNCONSCIONABILITY 
 
 Contract law’s doctrine of unconscionability has much in common with corporate law’s 
waste doctrine—but important differences too. Like corporate law’s waste doctrine, contract 
law’s unconscionability doctrine is rarely used, especially concerning substantive terms of 
exchange between commercial actors
190
 and routine transactions.
191
 This aversion rests on 
freedom-of-contract principles and judicial resistance to paternalism, despite terms that are 
unreasonable or impose hardship.
192
 Fairness is not necessarily the test, though there may be a 
tempting case to conceive of courts policing contractual exchange using that term.
193
 
Unconscionability signals absence of mutual assent on which contracts and contract law are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
had declined in value, when it would be more economically rational to sell them, get a tax deduction, and distribute 
the after-tax proceeds would be more economically sound. There is at least a hint of waste in a colloquial sense in 
such a decision that dissipates corporate assets without gaining anything obvious in return. But dividend policy rests 
in the discretion of the board, and it is difficult to conceive of a distribution to shareholders as a gift. It is a 
substantive return on investment. There may be any number of business or corporate justifications for the decision 
or relation between the transfer and a corporate gain. 
186
 See Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain Co., 218 A.2d 526 (Conn. 1966). 
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 See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 472–75 (1993). 
188 See Bebchuck, Fried & Walker, supra note 3, at 764–69. 
189
 See id. at 779–83. 
190
 Robert M. Lloyd, Making Contracts Relevant: Thirteen Lessons for the First-Year Contracts Course, 36 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 257, 267 (2004). 
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 Cnty Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng’g Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (―[I]t is the 
exceptional commercial setting where a claim of unconscionability will be allowed . . . .‖), aff’d, 444 F.2d 372 (2d 
Cir. 1971); Gillman v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 534 N.E.2d 824 (N.Y. 1988) (holding that a provision of a security 
agreement for the issuance of letter of credit that allowed a bank to deny a business access to a portion of its deposits 
was not unconscionable). 
192
 Carlson v. Hamilton, 332 P.2d 989, 990–91 (Utah 1958). 
193
 See Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 
123, 152 (2005); Philip Bridwell, The Philosophical Dimensions of the Doctrine of Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1513, 1522–28 (2003); Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 598, 626–29 (2005); Russell Korobkin, A ―Traditional‖ and ―Behavioral‖ Law-and-Economics Analysis of 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Company, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 441, 451–58 (2004). 
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based. That’s why the doctrine is scarcely used in arm’s-length transactions and more often in 
cases involving fiduciaries and consumer transactions.
194
  
 
As the following discussion shows, contract law’s propensity to use the unconscionability 
doctrine to police exchanges intensifies according to a fairly coherent logic, which is quite 
different than corporate law’s waste doctrine. The unconscionability doctrine is least likely to be 
used in true arm’s-length transactions, even on lopsided terms. Examples are a grubstake 
contract that pays off 200:1,
 
even when made by one of uncertain mental competency,
195
 and an 
emergency loan contract that pays off 80:1, even in a time of war and famine.
196
 Arm’s-length 
contracts require essentially infinite disparity in the substantive terms of exchange to warrant 
invoking unconscionability, as where the quantity in a goods contract is formulated to exceed the 
world’s total supply of the good,197 or the price term increases exponentially according to an 
essentially random function.
198
 It is not enough that one party’s profit on the transaction is equal 
to the other party’s contractual payments.199 The strikingly lopsided terms are not inherently 
objectionable but signal lack of mutual assent to a bargain.  
 
It is more likely that courts in equity will invoke the unconscionability doctrine to address 
obnoxious arrangements. Equity courts have refused specific performance of a land-sale contract 
with a value ratio of 40:1, though money damages for its breach could still be available.
200
 
Courts may refuse specific performance of commercial transactions in goods solely on the basis 
of a spike in price between contract formation and performance, though allowing that other 
remedies may be available.
201
 Those other remedies, including contract damages, may 
nevertheless be reduced in light of the equitable impulse that denies equitable relief.
202
 Nor is 
this reluctance limited to courts in equity, for courts also refuse to enforce bargains that shock 
the conscience.
203
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 Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. Bank of Am., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 396, 403 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that banking fees to 
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200
 Wollums v. Horsley, 20 S.W. 781 (Ky. 1892). 
201
 See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (holding that unconscionability bars specific 
performance though perhaps not other remedies when, in the sale of carrots, the contract price was $23 to $30 per 
ton but the market price seven months later at the time of delivery rose to $90 per ton). 
202
 Scott v. United States, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 443, 445 (1871) (―If a contract be unreasonable and unconscionable, 
but not void for fraud, a court of law will give to the party who sues for its breach damages, not according to its 
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 See John A. Spanogle, Jr., Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931, 938 (1969) (―Both 
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Policing is most common when a contract is between those in a confidential or fiduciary 
relationship, such as brother–sister and business manager–client. In such settings, courts have 
invoked constructive fraud to refuse enforcement of a land-sale contract with a value ratio of as 
little as 15:1.
204
 Additionally, a court held a contract unconscionable where it was formed at the 
urging of a trusted relation, such as an intimate partner, to exchange a contractual annuity right 
for one-fourth its economic value (a 4:1 ratio).
205
 Unconscionability is also invoked to refuse 
enforcement of a prenuptial contract on massively lopsided terms.
206
 All these cases involve such 
obnoxious terms to warrant skepticism about whether an actual bargain was intended.  
 
Contract law’s policing of unconscionable bargains is more frequent concerning 
employee or consumer contracts. A standard example concerns the terms of retail insurance 
contracts.
207
 Particular terms susceptible to challenge in employee and consumer contracts 
concern matters like arbitration
208
 and other impositions against legal recourse.
209
 Even in 
commercial contexts, judicial (and legislative) scrutiny is especially applied to terms limiting 
contract remedies.
210
 The context of limitations on remedy is among the more likely in which 
judges regard a term as unconscionable, and the Uniform Commercial Code supplies statutory 
support for this stance.
211
 
 
Over time, the classification of exchange types as arm’s-length or fiduciary in nature can 
change, along with contract law’s propensity to intensify scrutiny for unconscionability. A good 
modern example concerns franchise arrangements. These were once considered arm’s-length 
transactions, so that even a unilateral termination right was unobjectionable so long as the 
franchisor pointed it out and explained the clause to prevent unfair surprise.
212
 Gradually, 
however, courts and legislatures grew increasingly attracted to treating these more nearly as 
fiduciary in nature, policing lopsided termination and other clauses.
213
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Two additional features of contract law’s unconscionability doctrine are important. First, 
even a term not so repugnant as a substantive matter may be stricken for other reasons loosely 
classified as procedural.
214
 This refers to the background leading to contract formation, including 
the sophistication of the parties and how the term was presented and documented. For example, 
boilerplate terms in dense fine print using legalistic language that few people understand are 
suspect.
215
 The rationale for relief emphasizes limits on traditional assumptions of mutual assent 
and freedom of contract that warrant sparing use of unconscionability doctrine.
216
 Second, when 
any clause in a contract is unconscionable, the tendency is to strike the entire contract to 
discourage overreaching.
217
 When this is not a risk, it is possible to sever obnoxious clauses and 
enforce the rest of a contract.
218
  
 
To synthesize this doctrine, unconscionability is available primarily when traditional 
assumptions of contract law, mutual assent, and free bargaining cannot be relied on. Further, 
unconscionability is most likely to be invoked when some fiduciary or confidential relationship 
appears, equitable remedies are at stake, or the interests of certain groups, like franchisees, 
consumers, or employees, are in need of protection.
219
 The doctrine is an outgrowth of more 
fundamental judicial impulses to police unfairness, a formal expression of a tool not generally 
found elsewhere in traditional contract law.
220
 It is not a stretch to think about adapting the 
doctrine on behalf of shareholders making claims in equity that directors, who are fiduciaries, 
authorize odious pay contracts without serious bargaining. 
 
C. RECONCILIATION 
 
Comparison of corporate law’s waste doctrine and contract law’s unconscionability 
doctrine shows several unsurprising affinities—and yet some surprising and striking differences. 
Both are rarely invoked to upset an exchange transaction. Contract law’s sparing use is based on 
the freedom-of-contract principle, along with doubt about judicial competence to evaluate the 
substance of exchanges. Corporate law’s more sparing use is based on the principle of business 
judgment, along with similar doubt. Both doctrines are rarely used in order to avoid an avalanche 
of lawsuits seeking to rescind contracts and reverse corporation transactions. 
 
Related doctrines in contract and corporate law use overlapping concepts. Both bodies of 
law are averse to gifts, though for different reasons. Corporate law’s doctrine of waste prohibits 
gifts of corporate assets when the absence of a bargain means the corporation received nothing in 
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exchange.
221
 Contract law’s basic principle of consideration marks off as unenforceable promises 
to make gifts that lack the indicia of a bargain seen as central to enforceable exchange 
transactions.
222
 A sharp contrast appears concerning completed gifts, however, which the 
common law of contracts and property recognizes as irrevocable and yet corporate law would 
rescind. 
223
 
 
Neither body of law requires equivalence of the bargaining terms. In contract law, this is 
the peppercorn theory of consideration, and works to the extent that even nominal consideration 
performs functions required to separate exchanges from gifts.
224
 In both contract and corporate 
law, the issue is whether there is any consideration and, in corporate law, on occasion at least 
some relation between what the corporation transferred and what it received.
225
 Both bodies of 
law place a premium on the procedural side of transactions. In contract law, the 
unconscionability doctrine is customarily distinguished between substantive and procedural 
aspects.
226
 Procedural unconscionability addresses how a transaction originated, the way it was 
documented, how terms were presented and other aspects of bargaining and documenting the 
exchange. In corporate law, judges place great weight on the process a corporation follows to 
approve a transaction.
227
 
 
Above all, both bodies of law establish limits posing similar questions using similar 
syntax. In contract law, an exchange or term may be found unconscionable only if no fair-
minded person would propose it and no rational person would assent to it.
228
 In corporate law, a 
transaction may be upset only if the consideration received is so inadequate in value that no 
person of ordinary, sound business judgment would deem it worth what the corporation paid.
229
 
Both look to the relationship between economic and business risk on both sides of the 
exchange.
230
 
 
Despite affinities, differences appear in these contract and corporate law doctrines. 
Contract law is premised on freedom of exchange and encourages parties to act in their own self-
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interest so long as the parties are competent and have legal capacity;
231
 corporate law is primarily 
fiduciary-based and premised on imposing duties on corporate managers to elevate corporate and 
shareholder interests above personal interests.
232
 Contract law’s roots are in law courts, and 
standard remedies are money damages, not equitable relief; corporate law’s roots are in equity 
courts, which Delaware courts expressly retain, and standard remedies include equitable relief.
233
 
Given these two fundamental distinctions—corporate law as fiduciary and equitable, and 
contract law as arm’s-length and legal—one could expect the otherwise roughly equivalent 
policing doctrines to be more frequently or robustly used in corporate law than in contract law.  
 
Casebooks, cases, and scholarship suggest exactly the opposite. Indeed, contract law 
tends to resort to the unconscionability doctrine only when no other grounds exist to provide 
traditional doctrinal excuse, such as lack of capacity or competency, nondisclosure, 
misrepresentation, duress, or fraud.
234
 In striking contrast, a corporate law claim of waste is so 
difficult to sustain that there usually must be some other grounds for challenging a transaction, 
such as breach of fiduciary duty,
235
 fraud,
236
 or ultra vires (corporate law’s functional equivalent 
to lack of capacity or competency).
237
 These all can be tough to show, sometimes requiring such 
extremes as absorbing the corporation’s entire earnings, preventing shareholder distributions, or 
risking insolvency.
238
 One explanation is the lesser-perceived need for judicial superintendence 
and protection of shareholders compared to consumers, employees, franchisees, and other 
vulnerable types.
239
 But many shareholders are as vulnerable as those other types. A majority of 
American households increasingly rely on stock ownership as a savings vehicle, directly or 
through intermediaries.
240
  
 
Yet since the 1930s, corporate law has insulated executive pay contracts from judicial 
review for scrutiny by using the anemic waste standard. Scores of articles suggest how corporate 
law could be strengthened to provide requisite policing, but the suggestions have not been 
adopted. The population number of successfully contested stock-based pay cases under corporate 
law is miniscule. No appellate court has ever affirmed an order against a public corporationto 
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reduce its managerial compensation under a waste theory. In less than one-third of Delaware 
corporate law cases asserting waste in the executive pay context have shareholders prevailed at 
even the preliminary stages, such as motions to dismiss or for summary judgment (though the 
rate for non-Delaware cases is closer to half).
 
If pay contracts are to remain an important part of 
U.S. corporate life, it is necessary to find other routes to judicially scrutinize them, and 
contractual unconscionability is promising.  
 
IV. CONTRACT LAW SCRUTINY 
 
Stock-based pay arrangements are made pursuant to corporation–manager contracts. 
They are contracts like any other and should be rescinded when unconscionable—whether or not 
they amount to waste under corporate law. That a board approved the contract should not be 
dispositive—nor should a shareholder vote.241 Several hurdles must be navigated to enable this 
treatment. The hurdles mean that few cases would succeed through the gauntlet, catching only 
the most odious pay contracts and not touching legitimate ones or other categories of corporate 
contracts (like merger agreements, loan agreements, leases, and the like). 
 
To encapsulate the proposal and its appeal, consider a thumbnail sketch comparing how 
corporate law works with how contract law would work. Under corporate law, disputes involving 
a corporation’s internal affairs are governed by its state of incorporation, most often Delaware 
for public corporations, according to that state’s principle of conflicts-of-laws. Under corporate 
law, compensation decisions are protected by the business judgment rule. Even if shareholders 
assert board breach of duty of loyalty, that does not mean judges scrutinize pay contracts for 
fairness. Contracts are reviewed under the doctrine of waste, which few board decisions fail. 
Courts often cite any shareholder approval of related stock-pay plans to support deference to 
board decisions, though acknowledging limits in disclosure and voting. Shareholder challenges 
are usually treated as derivative, meaning to proceed the shareholder first must demand that the 
board redress the claim or show that to be futile, requiring proof that the pay or procedure 
leading to it were unprotected by the business judgment rule. Shareholders rarely win, even when 
challenging extravagant payouts. 
 
In contrast, a contract-law claim of unconscionability would begin by asserting that 
today’s pay contracts are not inevitably matters of internal affairs governed by the company’s 
state of incorporation, but by law determined under other conflicts-of-law principles. First, that 
would mean that contract law applies, not corporate law. Second, which state’s contract law 
applies would be determined according to which state has the greatest interest, influenced by 
where the contract was formed and performed, with contractual choice-of-law clauses being 
relevant, but not dispositive. Under contract law, no special deference is due to boards 
authorizing corporations to enter into unconscionable contracts. A shareholder allegation that a 
stock-based pay contract is unconscionable, ultra vires, and thus should be rescinded is the kind 
of claim that even corporate law may treat as direct rather than derivative.  If such claims are 
treated as derivative, they should at least support excusing demand as futile. Accordingly, 
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obstacles to shareholder litigation are reduced and shareholders more often proceed to the merits 
of the unconscionability determination.  
 
The following provides a detailed evaluation. Part IV.A evaluates the hurdles and how 
surmounting them serves a screening function. Part IV.B illustrates how the contract-law 
approach would work in comparison to the corporate-law approach.  
 
A. HURDLES AND SCREENS 
 
To enable shareholders to test executive compensation contracts using contract law raises 
challenges of the internal-affairs doctrine, contractual choice-of-law clauses, the classification of 
litigation as direct or derivative (which includes how to apply the ultra vires doctrine), and issues 
of judicial comity and competence.  
 
 
1. Internal Affairs 
 
The first issue is whether pay contracts are matters of a corporation’s internal affairs so 
that its state of incorporation controls without regard to any other factor, or whether they are like 
other contracts governed according to broader conflict-of-law principles. The internal-affairs 
doctrine is deeply embedded,
242
 though claims that it is founded in constitutional-law principles 
are contested.
243
 Its rationale rests on how the incorporating state has an interest in relationships 
among the corporation and its officers, directors, and shareholders. Those participants have a 
recognizable and protectable expectancy in knowing what laws apply to them in their relations 
with other participants. Subjecting them to inconsistent laws, especially multiple state laws, as 
opposed to a single federal law, should be minimized. Those interests are strong concerning 
governance matters like shareholder voting rights, board elections, corporate dividend policy, 
and transfers or protection of corporate control.
244
 
 
Other states may have an interest in those matters too, though they are seen to be weaker. 
States with an interest in a corporate contract include those states where the corporation has a 
large presence, measured by property ownership (including headquarters), sales, employees, 
shareholders, lenders, or other metrics.
245
 For internal affairs, however, even such interests do 
not necessarily justify altering the usual choice-of-law rule. As a result, state statutory efforts to 
reach out and regulate the internal affairs of corporations incorporated elsewhere but having 
some contacts with the local state are rebuffed.
246
 Even so, not all states embrace the internal-
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affairs doctrine with equal enthusiasm,
247
 and scholarly critiques based on fundamental 
principles of republican democracy test the doctrine’s legitimacy.248 Delaware courts seem to 
overstate the constitutional pedigree of the internal-affairs doctrine, largely in a political bid to 
retain its dominant position in U.S. corporate-law production, rather than on traditional legal 
argumentation.
249
  
 
Still, there is a class of contracts that do not fit within the internal-affairs doctrine and in 
which states other than the state of incorporation have a strong, or stronger, interest.
250
 
Corporations enter into numerous contracts with third parties that are clearly external matters. 
Contracts between corporations and auditors,
251
 lenders, landlords, suppliers, and labor unions 
are all external, rather than internal, affairs. Citizens of the state of contract formation and 
performance—and any breach with resulting legal enforcement—have a clear interest in these. 
The terms of those relationships, contractual and otherwise, need not be governed under the 
internal-affairs doctrine’s choice of domestic law, but either by contractual choice of law or 
general tests of interests under conflicts-of-law principles. 
 
Where do pay contracts between the corporation and officers fall? In one sense, they are 
internal affairs. They are internal affairs because the contract is authorized by the board on behalf 
of the corporation and its shareholders with corporate officers as the counterparty. The 
arrangement regulates the relationship of the corporation to the officer. It contemplates making 
the manager into a shareholder. The case for seeing the contract as such an internal affair is 
strong, especially if the recipient is also a director, chairman, or CEO.
252
 It is strengthened by 
standard academic talk that conceives of the stock-based pay device as a way to align manager 
incentives with shareholder interests.
253
 That is a way to reduce agency costs, quintessential 
matters of the internal affairs of the corporation.  
 
It is at least equally valid to classify manager-pay contracts as external affairs. The 
simplest case for that view occurs when a corporation enters into a contract with someone who 
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was not previously a director, officer, or shareholder of the corporation. The contract is simply 
an employment agreement with an outsider. In that view, it is akin to other contracts, including 
labor union contracts, nonmanagerial employment agreements, and loan agreements.
254
 That 
viewpoint does not change radically when an existing manager is the counterparty.
255
 It remains 
even if that person is already a shareholder. The contract is about compensation, the cost of an 
external resource imported into the enterprise, not about power among internal participants, like 
shareholder voting rights and related procedures for corporate decision making.  
 
Consider an extreme case of a contract that no state would recognize as enforceable—an 
illegal bargain of any sort. It could be a contract for illegal gambling, narcotics trafficking, 
pollution, prostitution, employment discrimination, or the like. Suppose a Delaware corporation 
is operating casinos and garbage removal from New Jersey. Its board approves and shareholders 
ratify an employment contract with the casino manager and sanitation manager. Both provide for 
corporate payment of bonus compensation triggered by the manager violating state law, say the 
casino manager staging dog fights or catering to minors and the refuse manager dumping excess 
waste in environmentally protected areas.  
 
Are those contracts to be seen as internal affairs and governed by Delaware corporate 
law, or can New Jersey contract law apply? Perhaps no one could say that the contracts violate 
Delaware corporate law. The board approved and shareholders ratified them following statutory 
procedures and consistent with standards of fiduciary duty in that state. But does that make them 
enforceable as a matter of contract law? They violate state law in New Jersey. Just because a 
board approves and shareholders ratify such a contract, or a stock-based pay contract violating 
unconscionability doctrine, does not make it an internal affair; it is a contract just like all others 
and susceptible to evaluation by courts in states where the contract is formed or to be 
performed.
256
  
 
For a more closely analogous case, suppose a corporation–manager contract contains a 
covenant not to compete, barring the manager from post-severance employment for five years for 
firms in the same industry and geographic region. Is that contract’s enforceability merely a 
question for the state where a corporation filed its charter, or is it instead  also subject to the 
contract law of the state of its formation or performance? Is that a question of the internal affairs 
of the corporation’s home state or the contract’s ―home state?‖ There is good authority that the 
state contract law of the place of formation or performance governs, not the contract law of the 
state of incorporation.
257
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Few cases directly address whether a stock-based pay contract is within the internal-
affairs doctrine or governed by the contract law of another state. In an unusual setting, 
shareholders of a Delaware corporation challenged a stock-option plan, approved by the board 
and ratified by shareholder vote.
258
 The Delaware Chancery Court, under precedents that now 
seem discarded, agreed with the shareholder that the plan was a mere gift in violation of 
Delaware corporate law.
259
 In doing so, the court rejected the proponents’ argument that New 
York contract law governed and supported enforcing it as an option contract, which a New York 
statute declared in certain cases would be enforceable even absent consideration.
260
  
 
The chancery court disagreed that New York contract law applied under the internal-
affairs doctrine (it also disagreed that the New York statute supported the proponents’ position 
even if it were governing law). The court’s justifications were: stock options are not ordinary 
transactions, but matters of corporate structure; the plaintiff’s stock certificate was issued in 
compliance with Delaware law; the certificate created rights under Delaware law; the stock 
options were approved by the board and shareholders; and the resulting controversy involved the 
internal affairs.
261
 The Delaware Supreme Court, though reversing the chancery court’s view that 
the plan amounted to a gift in violation of Delaware corporate law, agreed that Delaware 
corporate law governed, not New York contract law.
262
 It was impatient with the proponents’ 
choice-of-law argument, dismissing it in a paragraph, referring to the chancery court opinion, 
and saying it needed no further discussion. 
 
The chancery court opinion, after reciting the foregoing five arguments, then relied 
heavily on a famous United States Supreme Court case, Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.
263
 It held 
that the internal-affairs doctrine governed matters of state corporate law about the processes a 
board and shareholders followed in approving a corporate action.
264
 It was an odd citation—there 
was no question throughout the protracted Rogers litigation that the law of the state of 
incorporation governed. The wrangling was entirely about whether a federal district court sitting 
in a different state should decline jurisdiction given the uncertain state of the incorporating 
state’s laws.265 Neither the Supreme Court nor any of the other courts, nor even the plaintiffs in 
the case, ever asserted that any law other than the incorporating state should apply.  
 
Both these cases and all the opinions addressed stock-option plans, broad corporate 
programs applicable to hundreds of employees. Shareholders objected to corporate procedures, 
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share dilution, disclosure, and whether all that corporate machinery comported with the corporate 
statutes of the state of incorporation. There were no claims involving the common law of 
contracts. Given that disputation, it was difficult not to see the cases as entirely about internal 
affairs. Even the assertion of the one case’s plan proponents that New York contract law 
governed and supported the arrangement was far-fetched given how deeply into internal 
corporate procedures the case had plunged.  
 
An important implication of the Rogers case, however, concerns jurisdiction. Some 
courts that identify an issue as governed by the internal affairs doctrine, and thus another state’s 
corporate law, take that to bar jurisdiction.
266
 Others recognize that the internal-affairs doctrine is 
a choice-of-law principle and does not bar jurisdiction, enabling them to hear a case though 
applying another state’s corporate law.267 In the middle, courts recognize the internal-affairs 
doctrine as an issue, but neither a bar to jurisdiction nor a bar to applying that state’s own 
noncorporate law. This stance is justified when the court’s exercise of jurisdiction and 
adjudication would not ―inextricably involve‖ it in the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.268 
A helpful example appears in an employee’s breach-of-contract claim, which included stock-
based pay, against a Delaware corporation in a Pennsylvania court.
269
 The Delaware corporation 
sought dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under the internal-affairs doctrine, but the court rejected 
the argument and heard the case. 
 
2. Choice of Law; Choice of Forum 
 
If managers both control the contracting process and know there is risk that their pay 
contracts may be declared unconscionable by some states, they will select the laws of the 
jurisdiction most favorable to managers—those with the weakest contractual unconscionability 
laws. If so, that could make the contract approach to executive-pay contracts a dead end, no more 
capable than corporate law of policing obnoxious pay arrangements. 
 
On the other hand, a choice-of-law clause is not dispositive on conflict-of-law questions. 
True, many courts defer to contractual choice-of-law clauses, even when that means overriding a 
law or regulation of that state.
270
 But other relevant factors include where the contract was 
formed and where the corporation or manager are located. An important issue is which 
contending state has the greatest interest in a contract’s enforceability.271 Relevant are factors 
that appear in state quasi-domestic corporation laws, like where sizable portions of a 
corporation’s assets are located, revenues generated, payroll made, or shareholders reside.272 
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Furthermore, an assertion of unconscionability could render the entire contract 
unenforceable, including any choice-of-law clause.
273
 Imagine an employment contract with 
stock-based payments containing both an otherwise enforceable choice-of-law clause and 
obnoxious clauses alleged to be unconscionable. Suppose the stock-based pay contract contains 
both a choice-of-law clause and an obnoxious payout clause. And suppose holders file a case in 
state court where the corporation is headquartered or has other requisite contacts to give that 
court jurisdiction. Reviewing courts may apply the chosen law in deciding whether the contract 
is unconscionable, except when that would produce a result inconsistent with the public policy of 
the reviewing court’s state.274 If found to be unconscionable, the court is authorized to declare 
that and grant rescission.
275
  
 
Even a Delaware choice-of-law clause would mean Delaware contract law, rather than 
corporate law, would apply, potentially changing the analysis and outcome. Two principal 
Delaware Supreme Court cases state the contract standard, one addressing franchise 
termination
276
 and the other dealing with an insurance-contract arbitration clause.
277
 These cases 
adopted familiar tests from other jurisdictions, stating that unconscionability requires showing 
―absence of meaningful choice and contract terms unreasonably favorable to one of the 
parties.‖278 They ask whether a contract is ―such as no [person] in his [or her] senses and not 
under delusion would make on the one hand, and as no honest or fair [person] would accept, on 
the other.‖279  
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The test also considers the ―business practices of the community‖ to test ―whether the 
terms are so extreme as to appear unconscionable according to the mores and business practices 
of the time and place.‖280 Though both cases upheld the contract at issue, and numerous lower 
Delaware court opinions have followed suit,
281
 other Delaware cases have found contracts to be 
unconscionable, constituting an inventory that appears greater than cases finding corporate 
waste. Examples appear in a famous real-estate transfer setting,
282
 in overpayments based on 
erroneous corporate valuation calculations,
283
 and in attempts to limit liability in commercial 
transactions.
284
  
 
Finally, as the Delaware Supreme Court cases indicate, Delaware has no peculiar 
comparative advantage or special skill in contract law the way it has in corporate law. Its own 
body of contract law draws more heavily on broader common-law principles from other 
jurisdictions than its corporate law does.
285
 Just as many other states look to Delaware corporate 
law when developing their corporate law, Delaware contract law looks to the law in states with 
better developed contract law. The distinction of particularly well-developed state contract law 
likely would go to states like California, Massachusetts, or New York. The body of contract-
unconscionability law is certainly more robust in those states than Delaware’s corporate law of 
waste.
286
 Accordingly, at least at the margin, even Delaware contract law could incrementally 
expand the population of pay contracts found unconscionable compared to those found to violate 
its corporate law of waste. 
 
Aside from choice of law, a corporate contract could also contain a forum-selection 
clause, naming as the sole forum for litigation a management-friendly state, such as Delaware.
287
 
In fact, dozens of Delaware companies during 2010 adopted by-law amendments purporting to 
name Delaware as the sole forum to resolve intra-corporate disputes.
288
 This wave was prompted 
by a Delaware Chancery Court opinion suggesting that Delaware corporations adopt Delaware 
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forum clauses in their charters.
289
 This gambit is limited to intra-corporate affairs, however, 
usually expressly describing claims for breach of duty, statutory violations, and other matters 
within the internal-affairs doctrine.
290
 Accordingly, they would not apply to corporate pay 
contracts seen as external affairs. In any event, the enforceability of such clauses—whether 
appearing in by-laws, charters or contracts—depends generally on analysis analogous to that just 
discussed concerning choice-of-law clauses. 
 
3. Direct Ultra Vires Suits and Derivative Demands 
 
Under unavoidable corporate-law rules, shareholder challenges to pay contracts as 
unconscionable would have to be classified as ―derivative‖ or ―direct.‖ If derivative, the claim is 
brought on behalf of the corporation as a whole. Shareholders would face the hurdles all such 
suits pose under corporate law that grants considerable power and deference to the board.
291
 The 
issue of whether a shareholder claim is direct or derivative is about the corporation’s internal 
affairs and therefore governed by the home state’s corporate law.292 
 
Many corporate-law statutes, including Delaware’s, state expressly that claims alleging 
that an action was beyond a corporation’s power may be asserted in a direct action.293 They 
authorize that recovery of any compensation in such cases is made to the corporation, though the 
form of the case is direct, not derivative. This is the strongest ground to justify classifying 
challenges to pay contracts as unconscionable as direct claims, avoiding the hurdles derivative 
litigation poses.
294
 Even for states with such statutes, however, a preliminary question is whether 
a shareholder can allege that an unconscionable employment agreement is ultra vires—beyond 
the corporation’s power. Modern corporations are empowered to engage in any lawful activity, 
but are not empowered to engage in any unlawful activity.
295
  
 
 Corporations have no power to enter into bargains that are unlawful because they violate 
positive law expressed in statutes or judicial doctrines.
296
 Contracts are illegal when they violate 
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anti-bribery, antitrust, environmental statutes, or common-law rules prohibiting unlawful 
restraints of trade.
297
 Such illegal activities are ultra vires. (Further examples of illegal bargains 
that people lack legal capacity to form and are more likely to involve individuals than businesses, 
are those for arson, murder, prostitution, narcotics trafficking, and tax evasion.) Toward the 
opposite, but equally easy, extreme are bargains that are merely unenforceable because they lack 
requisites of valid contracts, such as consideration or mutual assent. But such defects do not 
make them illegal. 
 
Unconscionable bargains can fall into either of those extremes or in between, depending 
on the exact reasons why they shock the conscience of a court. Some are both procedurally and 
substantively unconscionable while others are either one or the other but not both. Those that 
suffer from both infirmities more likely warrant being called illegal than those suffering from 
only one that may be declared merely unenforceable. Some fail because the terms of exchange 
demonstrate that assent was defective, and thus they seem more akin to merely unenforceable, 
but not illegal, bargains. An overly broad covenant not to compete may be an example. Others 
fail because they are repugnant on grounds of public policy, though not expressly outlawed.
298
 A 
contract providing for a bonus to an employee for staging dog fights is illustrative. Executive-
pay contracts challenged as unconscionable would not automatically fit into either category, but 
those plagued by both procedural and substantive unconscionability and violating public policy 
would be classified as ultra vires. 
 
But not all states have statutes authorizing direct actions for ultra vires claims, and 
though ultra vires claims are often treated as direct, they are not always treated that way.
299
 
Those points require a more complete evaluation of the line between direct and derivative suits, 
which is not always clear.
300
 The ultimate issue is whether an alleged harm to be remedied is 
better conceived as individual to a shareholder or to the corporation as a whole.
301
 If the 
corporation suffers the alleged harm and the corporate interest is remedied by a favorable 
judgment, the corporation is the real party in interest. But that conception is loaded with inherent 
difficulty, reflected in how corporation law provides that directors owe duties to their 
corporations and its shareholders.
302
 Thus, breaches of duty, a fundamental element of corporate 
law, may result in harm to the corporation, the shareholders, or both. The result of that inherent 
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conceptual difficulty is that factors inform the analysis and classification decision, not scientific 
algorithms or natural-law truths.
303
 
 
A common approach to classifying claims as direct or derivative recognizes that there are 
some clear examples at the extremes. Claims for breach of duty often are derivative, and those 
for denying shareholders’ particular rights (like inspection, voting, or preemptive rights) are 
invariably direct.
304
 Similarly polar, a claim that a contract should be enforced is usually 
derivative, as are most claims seeking money damages, whereas a claim that corporate action 
was beyond the corporation’s power (the ultra vires claim) is usually seen as direct305 (as are 
most claims seeking injunctive or other prospective relief
306
). Likewise, claims seeking 
cancellation of a stock-issuance plan are seen as direct if grounded on a theory of improper 
purpose but derivative when grounded on a theory of inadequate consideration.
307
 
 
 As these examples suggest, when classifying elusive cases, two factors are particularly 
useful: the theory of liability and the remedy sought. In challenging a stock-based pay contract, 
shareholders are more likely to succeed in classifying the case as direct if they assert that its 
unconscionable character puts it beyond the corporation’s authority to execute it and the primary 
remedy sought is rescission.
308
 The liability theory of unconscionability aligns the case with 
those asserting ultra vires claims more often, though not always, seen as direct and not 
derivative.
309
 The remedial theory of rescission aligns the case with those seeking equitable 
relief, likewise more often, though not always, seen as direct not derivative.
310
 If the claim 
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included an assertion of restitution for value transferred, the statutes authorizing direct actions 
for ultra vires support awarding that amount to the corporation, without disturbing the direct-
action classification.
311
  
 
It is not essential to classify the case as direct for the non-Delaware contract law 
approach to work. Even when an ultra vires claim is for some reason classified as derivative, it 
often has the minimum effect of justifying the excusing of shareholder demand on the board as 
futile.
312
 That surmounts an important hurdle shareholders face in getting a decision on the 
merits in derivative litigation.
313
 Demand can be excused for other reasons, too, and a challenge 
to an executive-pay contract heard on the merits. 
 
Additional hurdles may appear, however. Corporation law allows independent board 
members to take control of the litigation and announce it is in the corporation’s interest to 
dismiss the case.
314
 Courts are inclined to allow this, applying corporate law that venerates board 
independence and is averse to second-guessing even the most extravagant board decisions. But a 
shareholder advancing to that stage of litigation armed with an assertion of contractual 
unconscionability has a new arrow in her quiver. Stronger than the anemic doctrine of corporate 
waste, this new arrow could tip the balance to shareholder victory in an appropriate case.
315
 
 
4. Comity and Judicial Competence 
 
Despite credible grounds for displacing the internal-affairs doctrine and lowering the 
hurdles to shareholder litigation, courts may understandably hesitate to venture into this territory. 
Legal uncertainties may appear concerning the internal affairs doctrine versus other conflict-of-
law principles, and it may be challenging to faithfully apply another state’s corporation law to 
classify the case as direct or derivative. Even the most conscientious judges may find these 
difficulties too daunting and invoke comity to dismiss a case.
316
  
 
Judges may be even more cautious about their competency on the merits of a claim, given 
contract complexity.
317
 Limited judicial competence is a common rationale for corporate law’s 
business judgment rule, for judicial reticence to invoke corporate law’s waste doctrine, and for 
the rarity of judicial declarations finding contractual unconscionability. Concern about judicial 
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competence may strengthen in proportion to the complexity of a corporate contract. Many 
opinions showing cautiousness in policing stock-based pay state this competence modestly.
318
 
Even when using sophisticated experts to referee a dispute, courts say it is thorny to estimate the 
value of pay that stock-based devices yield and harder yet to estimate the value a recipient 
contributes in exchange.
319
  
 
The solution appears in the strict tests judges apply under both corporate law and contract 
law. The doctrine of corporate waste eases the challenge by invoking the doctrine only in cases 
so extreme that everyone can see the payment was merely a gift; contractual unconscionability 
ameliorates the difficulty by limiting its use to cases in which everyone can see a contract or 
term is obnoxious. Evaluation under either doctrine does not require judicial review using 
advanced financial calculus. Judges will not find this more daunting than many other problems 
they face every day. (And remember the question of contract unconscionability is a question of 
law for judges,
320
 not for juries, so there is no risk of runaway juries upsetting legitimate 
corporate pay contracts.)  
 
As in corporate law and contract law generally, judicial competence is probably stronger 
concerning procedural aspects. Evaluation of contract formation would not be confined to 
corporate law’s narrow focus on nominal or formal director independence or information. It 
would consider the bargaining process. Professors Bebchuk and Fried show how the formal 
process sometimes lacks bargaining.
321
 The process can be meaningless, even though it may give 
the appearance of legitimacy by formal board independence supported by documentation 
supplied by consultants. And those procedures may be no more reliable when undertaken in 
compliance with Dodd–Frank Act requirements concerning director and consultant 
independence.
322
 Nor would shareholder voting required by that Act be dispositive, though 
shareholder votes against pay proposals that a board simply ignores would support an inference 
of procedural unconscionability.
323
 Shareholders, acting through their board agents, may purport 
to be bound by contracts that are worse than take-it-or-leave it contracts of adhesion. Absence of 
bargaining would support characterizing the resulting stock-based pay contract as afflicted by 
procedural unconscionability. 
 
Analysis of substantive unconscionability would be more complex. It would also be 
contextual, so stating broad principles is difficult. But two tests may be suggested. One would 
compare the substantive terms of the option pay contract with model terms such as those offered 
by academics in the new reform agenda reviewed previously.
324
 Those prescriptions endorse the 
validity of an option pay contract containing long-term alienation restraints, limitations on 
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managerial discretion in determining grant and exercise dates and procedures, and prohibiting 
hedging instruments to circumvent the plan. Contract terms containing such features should be 
viewed favorably. These models rebuke pay contracts with stock options that vest and become 
exercisable within brief time periods, allowing managerial determination of grant and exercise 
dates and procedures, and permitting managerial use of circumvention devices. Contract terms 
containing these features should be viewed skeptically. A primary issue would be whether the 
terms are reasonably designed to induce retention or transfer corporate value with little received 
in exchange.
325
 
 
 Another approach, though more intricate, would compare dollar amounts, relating the 
value of stock-based pay to the value contribution managers make in exchange. This would 
resemble the proportionality test Delaware courts once applied to test pay contracts for corporate 
waste.
326
 For some arrangements, either part may be difficult or impossible to measure with 
reasonable certainty.
327
 In such cases, it would be imprudent to declare the contract 
unconscionable, and modesty regarding judicial competency provides reasonable grounds for 
restraint. In some cases, however, it may be relatively easy to identify or estimate the amounts 
with reasonable certainty. In the vast majority of those cases, the ratio, even if substantial, would 
pass judicial scrutiny, given that the doctrine of contractual unconscionability still gives 
substantial deference to freedom-of-contract principles and recognizes limited judicial 
competence. But in the few cases where that ratio can be measured with reasonable certainty and 
does shock the judicial conscience, the contract should be declared unconscionable and 
rescinded. 
 
Even so, these points about judicial competence present another hurdle to shareholders—
and another reason skeptics should not oppose this proposal in principle. The hurdles 
shareholders face to obtain independent judicial review are formidable, so there is scant risk of 
any floodgate effect in promoting the doctrine of contractual unconscionability as a way to police 
pay contracts.
328
 It offers an incremental increase in the population of disputes susceptible to 
judicial rebuke for overreaching. One or a few cases entertaining the claim or declaring a stock-
based pay contract unconscionable would yield the desired effect of providing a legal check 
against corporate boards being excessively solicitous of senior managers.  
 
B. APPLICATIONS 
 
The following illustrates some applications of this theory. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, it begins with a detailed comparison of The Walt Disney Company case followed 
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by a brief illustration concerning the New York Stock Exchange case, along with notes on a 
pending Citigroup case. 
 
1. The Walt Disney Company 
 
The Walt Disney Company is a Delaware corporation headquartered in California. Its 
board entered into an employment contract, which included stock-based payments, with an 
outsider it recruited into a senior executive position. Negotiation, execution, performance, and 
termination of the contract all took place in California (and incidentally in some other states 
during travel and remote negotiations, though never Delaware). The contract stated that it was to 
be governed by California law.
329
 The contract provided for a lucrative payout, consisting 
dominantly of very short-term stock options, if the company fired the executive without cause. 
Fourteen months later, the company did fire the executive without cause, triggering a payout to 
him of nearly $140 million in cash and stock. The massive payout in relation to the modest work 
drew intense criticism throughout the United States. 
 
Shareholders sued under Delaware corporate law and eventually lost. The proceedings 
were extensive and resulted in a series of shifting Delaware corporate law judicial opinions. The 
first trial-court opinion dismissed the complaint.
330
 Notably, the court said the contract was just 
like a board decision to authorize a loan and/or to borrow money.
331
 That analogy is interesting 
in the context of this Article since it supports the view expressed here that pay contracts do not 
implicate the internal-affairs doctrine, but may be governed by the law of a state other than the 
state of incorporation. Despite that recognition, neither that opinion nor any other in the litigation 
gave any further consideration to contract law issues but examined the entire case through the 
lens of Delaware corporate law. 
 
The first appellate opinion reversed this dismissal of the complaint and allowed leave to 
amend.
332
 The court said this is a ―troubling case on the merits‖; the board and its processes were 
―casual, if not sloppy and perfunctory‖; the contract gave an ―exceedingly lucrative, if not 
luxurious‖ payout compared to the executive’s value to the company; and the ―sheer size‖ of the 
payout ―pushes the envelope of judicial respect for the business judgment‖ of the board.333 Even 
so, while this justified reversing dismissal and allowing leave to amend the complaint, the court 
denied that all this satisfied derivative litigation’s demand requirement or excused it as futile. 
Thus, although they have no corporate law significance, those harsh judicial excoriations could 
have been nearly decisive of a claim for contractual unconscionability. 
 
The second trial-court opinion held that demand was excused because the shareholders 
raised sufficient doubt that the pay and procedure were protected by the business judgment 
rule.
334
 The allegations did not merely suggest directors were being grossly negligent and failing 
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to become informed—all of which the court signaled might not justify excusing demand—
instead, the allegations suggested directors had ―consciously and intentionally disregarded‖ their 
duties.
335
 Still, all this meant was that demand was excused as a matter of corporate law. Again, 
under contract law, those assertions would strongly support a determination of absence of arm’s-
length bargaining amounting to a defect in contract formation and justifying, along with the 
exorbitant payout, a finding that the contract was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. 
 
The third trial-court opinion, reaching the corporate law merits after hearing the case, 
resolved the issues differently.
336
 The directors fell short of best practices, but that did not violate 
Delaware corporate-law duties, which are far weaker. They did not act in bad faith and were not 
grossly negligent.
337
 Nor did they commit waste, despite the ―breathtaking amounts of severance 
pay.‖338 Waste is ―rarely found in Delaware courts‖ because it puts an ―onerous burden‖ on the 
one asserting it.
339
 The court added: ―waste is a rare, unconscionable case[] where directors 
irrationally squander or give away corporate assets.‖340 The quoted reference to 
unconscionability is curious, incorrectly suggesting equivalence between corporate law’s 
doctrine of waste and contract law’s doctrine of unconscionability.  
 
The final appellate opinion affirmed this outcome, saying the board did not breach any 
Delaware corporate-law duty, though repeating that directors did not live up to best practices.
341
 
No waste occurred under Delaware corporate law because there was a ―rational business 
purpose‖ to the deal, one of inducing the executive to leave other employment to work for 
Disney, and there could be no waste when merely paying amounts pursuant to a contract.
342
 
There was no inquiry about whether the contract was valid as a matter of contract law. The 
lawyers and the judges all focused solely on questions of corporate law. 
 
It is not difficult to imagine that a California court applying contract law may respond 
differently. To begin to see this, consider how the case would have been handled if the executive 
were suing Disney. He would not have filed a corporate law case in Delaware under Delaware 
corporation law. He would have filed a breach-of-contract case, probably in California, under 
state contract law. If the board wished, it could possibly have defended against such an action by 
invoking contractual unconscionability. There would have been essentially no remote reason to 
think that the issue was a matter of the internal affairs of the corporation so that Delaware law 
governed.
343
 It would have done the board essentially no good to defend the case by saying that 
performing the contract would amount to waste under Delaware corporate law. But there would 
have been a strong case that it was unconscionable under California contract law.
344
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Now suppose, as this Article suggests, shareholders had not sued the board and the 
executive under Delaware corporate law. Suppose instead they sued in a California court under 
state contract law asserting the contract was unconscionable, seeking rescission (and, to the 
extent any payments had been made, restitution and, to the extent they had not, an injunction).
345
 
The applicable law is California contract law because the contract was formed, performed, and 
terminated there between California citizens, one human and one corporate. The internal-affairs 
doctrine does not change that and the choice of California law.
346
 
 
As to whether the claim is direct or derivative, the remedy of rescission strongly supports 
classifying the case as direct and could be accompanied by an injunction against any payouts 
under the contract. The only real issue is, to the extent payments had been made, whether 
recovering the payments in restitution should change the characterization. The statutes 
authorizing direct actions for ultra vires conduct support retaining that characterization even 
when the resulting award of compensation is paid to the corporation.
347
 The theory of liability 
supports treating it as direct, at least insofar as shareholders assert that the contract is both 
procedurally and substantively unconscionable, if not because the public-policy stakes are acute. 
If the case were classified as derivative, demand would readily be excused in any event for the 
reasons the Delaware courts gave when they excused demand. 
 
On the merits, there are deep defects in the process, not amounting to an arm’s-length 
bargain between the board and officer. With those shareholder agents shortchanging the process, 
the case for procedural unconscionability is strong. The substantive inquiry focuses on the deal at 
the time the contract was formed. At that time, a fair-minded and rational person might have 
agreed to pay a top executive like this millions of dollars for performance. If the person 
performed badly and turned out to be worth far less, that would be chalked up to an unwise or 
improvident bargain, as many bargains in fact turn out and that contract law does not disturb. But 
the clause at issue here did not involve high payments for uncertain performance. It involved 
high payments upon being fired. The contract, when written, contained this exploding payment 
due precisely when the company had determined that performance was subpar. 
 
What the company claimed it received for dangling that lucre was attracting the executive 
to the company in the first place. The company had to induce the executive to join Disney 
instead of pursuing other opportunities. As the Delaware courts suggested, it is difficult to 
measure what inducements would be reasonable.
348
 That is a function of the executive’s 
opportunity costs and the company’s alternatives. But that is readily and more rationally handled 
by payments targeted to that initial attraction, like a signing bonus, a high annual pay rate, a high 
annual bonus amount or percentage, or something of the sort. To agree up front on a payment 
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that would clearly reach into the tens of millions of dollars and could easily be payable within 
short order defies rationality and fairness. Combined, the board’s inexcusable process and the 
questionable initial commitment to pay someone upon being fired makes a credible case for a 
court applying traditional contract law to rescind it as unconscionable.
349
 
2. The New York Stock Exchange 
 
The corporate law case concerning the $140-million payday of the ousted CEO of the 
New York Stock Exchange (―NYSE‖), Richard Grasso,350 may have turned out the other way 
too, had the court applied contract law. In the years right before the NYSE became a public 
corporation, it was a nonprofit New York corporation governed by that state’s corporate law 
governing nonprofits. Serving the NYSE as Board Chair and CEO was Richard A. Grasso from 
1995 until he resigned in controversy in 2003. Grasso served under a series of contracts made in 
1995, 1999, and 2003. From 1995 to2002, the NYSE paid Grasso a base of just over $1 million, 
plus annual bonuses that were less than $1 million in 1995 but exceeded $10 million in 2002. 
Though generous by ordinary worker standards, these payouts were modest by corporate CEO 
standards.  
 
That changed in 2003 when Grasso’s contract called for a lump-sum payment of $140 
million on the spot plus another $50 million payable over the next four years. He procured this 
contract over strenuous objections of many NYSE board members. Grasso used a suspect 
approval procedure. The board members approved the contract at a board meeting whose agenda 
did not list the subject. Many board members who opposed it were therefore absent from the 
meeting. Those voting for approval did not represent a majority of the board. Board members 
opposed to the contract promptly objected to the exorbitant payout blessed using this irregular 
practice.  
 
The ensuing fury engulfed Grasso in a public and private firestorm that led to his forced 
resignation. His successor as interim chair investigated the affair and asked the office of the New 
York Attorney General (―AG‖) to pursue formal legal enforcement proceedings. The AG did so, 
seeking rescission of the contract on grounds specifically authorized in New York’s nonprofit 
corporation law and associated common-law theories related to those statutory grounds. But the 
New York Court of Appeals granted Grasso’s motion to dismiss most of the AG’s claims on 
jurisdictional grounds.
351
  
 
The corporate-law statute giving the AG jurisdiction to sue nonprofit corporations 
detailed some of the types of claims the AG was authorized to bring.
352
 Those included the two 
being brought—wrongful transfer of corporate assets and breach of fiduciary duty. But all 
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authorized actions required the AG to prove some element of fault. The court therefore dismissed 
all claims the AG brought that did not require such a showing, which included claims for unjust 
enrichment based on statutory provisions limiting compensation to reasonable levels and 
restitution based on a statutory requirement that a board majority approve executive 
compensation.
353
 
 
Neither the AG nor the courts, including the New York Court of Appeals, ever 
considered a more fundamental and simple question: whether the contract was unconscionable. 
There is a compelling case that it was. The procedure used to approve the contract was defective. 
Taking up action on a material matter not listed on a business meeting agenda is irregular. 
Taking final action on a controversial matter at such a meeting when known opponents are 
consequently absent is aggressive. Approving this executive’s compensation by less than a 
majority board vote violated the New York nonprofit corporation law. The amount—including 
the immediate $140 million—was shocking, particularly when it was far from obvious what, if 
anything, the NYSE was to get in return. (The transfer was so shocking that it is tempting to 
suppose that it even triggered corporate law’s waste doctrine, but that is not a sturdy doctrine to 
rely upon.)  
 
Those features of unconscionability manifest the elements of fault that the New York 
Court of Appeals said were the only kinds of claims that the New York’s nonprofit-corporation 
statute authorized the AG to bring. A claim of contract unconscionability, therefore, would have 
had a greater chance of success than those the AG brought and that the court of appeals 
dismissed. It seems that the AG did not bring such a claim because that office made the 
understandable assumption that the question was entirely one of corporate law—a widespread 
assumption that the scope and tenor of the court’s opinion shows the New York Court of Appeals 
also shared. Indeed, the New York court’s opinion concentrates entirely on the corporate-law 
features of the transaction and litigation, riveting upon the statutory and common-law aspects of 
corporate governance—board duties, the business judgment rule, conflicts of interest—without 
ever thinking outside that box about the possibility that the case was about the enforceability of a 
contract under basic and ancient principles of the common law of contracts.
354
 
 
3. Citigroup Inc. 
 
A $68-million severance payment went to CEO Charles Prince of Citigroup Inc. just after 
that company self-destructed for its role in the financial catastrophe that began in 2008.
355
 
Shareholders filed a derivative lawsuit in Delaware alleging that the payout was waste.
356
 The 
company’s board moved to dismiss on the ground that the shareholders had failed to make a 
demand on the board as the law governing derivative litigation requires.
357
 The shareholders 
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persuaded the court that such a demand would be futile.
358
 They are therefore in the same place 
that the Disney shareholders got to by the middle of their litigation challenging the $140-million 
payout to the Disney executive in that case. If this case proceeds under the waste theory, the 
shareholders stand an extremely small chance of success on the merits. After all, the company 
can point out that it got something in exchange: Prince signed an agreement with non-compete, 
non-disparagement, non-solicitation, and release-of-claims provisions.
359
 If the case made the 
claim of contractual unconscionability, the odds of success would improve since those promises 
could persuasively be described as trivial formalities. The probability of success would rise more 
significantly if the case were heard by a court outside of Delaware. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Compensation for corporate executives skyrocketed in the past two decades, with a 
particular proliferation of stock-based components. Recent experience challenges many of the 
theories supporting the trend, especially the once-heralded notion that they align managerial 
incentives with shareholder interests. The new reform agenda prescribes rehabilitation by 
redesigning contracts, especially stock-based components, to focus managerial attention on long-
term business value rather than short-term price, with suggestions for expanding shareholder 
power to increase board accountability. 
 
Yet it remains doubtful whether those steps suffice to restore the erstwhile appeal of 
stock-based pay in many cases. Still missing is legal oversight of pay contracts, and there are few 
prospects for providing any. Though some see no problem with prevailing conditions while some 
opponents might prefer abolishing stock options, this Article offers what amounts to a middle 
position: identifying problems and offering a new legal theory of contractual unconscionability 
to police obnoxious cases without upsetting legitimate deals.  
 
A fundamental objection to this proposal is how investors may recoil at the prospect of 
gadfly fellow shareholders challenging corporate pay contracts. Existing corporate law and 
governance controls the gadfly shareholder. Statutes give directors plenary power and 
shareholders limited rights. Most decisions are made by directors and officers, not shareholders. 
That protects fellow shareholders from each other. Though appealing on a wide range of 
subjects, especially routine business transactions and strategy, the system does not work 
perfectly for all subjects. The subject of executive compensation illustrates.  
 
There is widespread national debate and valid criticism of executive pay. Although some 
believe that the corporate-governance system is self-correcting, supporting evidence is limited, 
and most policy levers that have been tried to aid correction have either backfired or seem 
unlikely to succeed. Further, the proposed shareholder redress is narrow, faces substantial 
hurdles that screen out gadflies, and is subject to judicial supervision that controls gadfly risks.  
 
An additional benefit arises from accepting some cost of risking having gadflies upset the 
equilibrium. It is a way to restore a modicum of external pressure on the State of Delaware, the 
leading promulgator of corporate law for national use. Historically, Delaware faced such 
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pressure from other states when states competed with each other to attract corporate-chartering 
business. Many scholars believed that this competition led to optimal law, and though others said 
it led to suboptimal law, the practical reality is that the competition has ended, and Delaware 
faces no such pressure today.  
The federal government still provides some pressure. In the past decade, the two most 
propitious times for action occurred in 2002 in the wake of the frauds accompanying the bursting 
of the Internet bubble and in 2010 after the financial destruction accompanying the bursting of 
the housing bubble. Each episode prompted significant statutory reform: in the Sarbanes–Oxley 
Act of 2002 and the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010. Both contained provisions that preempted 
traditional state corporation law in a few areas—in 2002, the law targeted boards concerning 
accounting-related matters, and in 2010, the law targeted risk-related matters, including 
executive compensation.  
 
Though these are nontrivial incursions, they leave Delaware enormous leeway that could 
stand an external check from sister states. This Article provides a roadmap for a judicial review 
of obnoxious executive-pay packages. In part, it is an invitation to enable Delaware’s sister states 
to project incremental pressure on Delaware. That could stimulate a greater appreciation within 
Delaware for the effects of its approach to corporate affairs outside the boundaries of the small 
state.  
